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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
If people stay out of employment for long periods this often creates social and 
economic problems. Therefore, it is important to know the risk factors 
responsible for long-term unemployment and inactivity. Most research is about 
single spells of unemployment and inactivity. However, it is also highly relevant 
to know, for example, whether an unemployed person who has found a job, 
keeps the job or becomes unemployed again after a short time. Studies that deal 
with a sequence of transitions do exist but are relatively scarce. Furthermore, the 
period covered in these studies is usually relatively short.  
This report analyses patterns of work and use of benefits over the full life course 
on the basis of Dutch data. The available data, however, only cover a period of 
twelve years. Therefore, the patterns observed during this period are used to 
simulate life courses for a cohort. The simulation implies that for each 
(simulated) member of the cohort we know on a quarterly basis for 
approximately 50 years whether he has a job, a social benefit or neither a job nor 
a social benefit. So, we have approximately 200 data points for each (simulated) 
individual. The original data on which the simulation model is based contain the 
following individual characteristics: age, gender and ethnic origin. The level of 
education was estimated on the basis of income data from our dataset. The 
distinction according to these four characteristics has been maintained in the 
simulation. 
The transition probabilities used in the simulation were estimated using 
multinomial logit models. The Dutch Statistical Office created the dataset that we 
have used for the estimation by merging Tax Office data and municipal data, 
both administrative data. The dataset contains information on almost 80.000 
persons aged between 15 and 65 years. Most of them can be followed during the 
entire data period (1989-2000). We know exactly the starting and ending dates of 
the subsequent periods in employment, in unemployment while claiming an 
unemployment insurance benefit, in social assistance, in inactivity while 
claiming a disability benefit, in inactivity while claiming a sickness benefit, in 
(pre-)retirement, in inactivity without income (also referred to as ´inactivity`) and 
in a number of combinations of these situations. Young people in school without 
a job belong to the inactive without income. Some people are only in the panel 
for part of this period because they die, reach the official pension age, emigrate, 
enter active age or immigrate during this period. The four individual 
characteristics mentioned earlier were included as explanatory variables in the 
equations and were often significant, pointing at differences between the various 
groups. 
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In addition to the four individual characteristics, two other factors were also 
included: 
1. the time a person has already spent in his current situation. It appears that 
this duration dependence of transition probabilities is often significant. We 
find that the longer a person is unemployed, the more likely he is going to 
stay unemployed. Duration dependence, however, is also relevant in case of 
employment, although here duration has a positive effect on the probability 
of staying employed; 
2. previous unemployment experience. Our results indicate that if a person has 
experienced previous unemployment, he has a higher chance of becoming 
unemployed again during the first years in employment. Hence, there is 
evidence of cumulating unemployment. 
 
In order to obtain indications of the importance of duration dependence and 
cumulating unemployment, we have made simulations with and without these 
factors.  
With the multinomial logit models the quarterly transition probabilities from a 
given situation to all other situations can be computed. These probabilities 
(including the probability to stay in the same situation) add up to 1. Then from 
this probability distribution random drawings are taken to determine the situation 
at time t+1 given the situation at t. The following situations are distinguished: 
a. having a job; 
b. being without a job and claiming an unemployment insurance benefit; 
c. being without a job and claiming a social assistance benefit; 
d. being without a job and claiming a disability benefit; 
e. being without a job and claiming a sickness benefit; 
f. being without a job and claiming a (pre-)pension benefit; 
g. being without a job and without a benefit; 
h. having both a job and an unemployment insurance benefit; 
i. having both a job and a disability benefit. 
 
Not every transition between these situations is feasible. A person can, for 
example, only get an unemployment benefit if he has worked for a sufficiently 
long period. Furthermore, the duration of this benefit depends on the length of 
the preceding working period. These types of restrictions have been accounted 
for in the simulations. Life courses have been simulated for 100.000 individuals 
in each simulation. This large number is necessary to obtain stable distributions, 
even for subgroups.   
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The simulations are first of all used to analyse concentration in the use of social 
benefits. To that end we calculated the life time use of social benefits by adding 
up all the benefit spells an individual experiences during his life course. It 
appears that the 10 percent that has the highest use of benefits account for more 
than 30 per cent of the total use of benefits by the cohort members during their 
life courses. This concentration is apparent for all types of benefits: 
unemployment insurance, disability and social assistance. Although the use of 
benefits depends on gender, ethnic origin and education, the distinction between 
social groups only accounts for a small part of the concentration: the 
concentration within the different groups is of similar size as the overall 
concentration. Duration dependence and cumulative unemployment lead to 
higher concentration, but also here the effect is relatively small. Therefore, 
concentration is largely due to random factors and to routes in social benefits. 
With the latter we mean that once a person is a benefit claimant he does not just 
have a certain probability of staying in this situation, but he also has a higher 
probability of making the transition to a different type of benefit. 
The level of concentration on a life-time basis within the group of benefit users is 
similar to the level obtained from the twelve-year data-period. However, the 
result is different when we also take the group into account that does not use 
benefits at all during their life course. In the twelve-year period 45 per cent of the 
panel has a benefit at least once, while this is 90 per cent over the full life course. 
If we leave out pre-pension and early retirement benefits (which almost 
everybody in the cohort has), the latter figure is still 75 per cent. This means that 
if we also take the individuals into account that do not use benefits at all, 
concentration over the full life course is less than over a shorter period of, for 
example 12 years.  
Whether the total use of benefits during the life course is a problem for society 
also depends on the total time worked. For 10 per cent in the cohort the total time 
in a benefit is longer than the total time worked. For the twelve-year period this 
is 20 per cent. In the cohort almost everybody has worked at least once, while 
this is 80 per cent in the twelve-year period. In the cohort slightly more than 50 
per cent works for more than 30 years in total. 
Age is a dominant factor if we look at the pattern of work and use of social 
benefits during the life course. At older age people tend to work less and make 
more use of benefits. However, there is no evidence that unemployment 
insurance benefits are extensively being used as an unofficial exit route to 
pension age. Next to age, ethnic origin is the most important factor. People 
originating from non-industrialised countries have less job opportunities and 
make more use of benefits. Women and the lower educated show a similar level 
of use of benefits as do higher educated and men, respectively, but work less than 
the latter. 
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The report also contains two policy-relevant simulations. The first simulation 
deals with the possibility of an unemployment insurance benefit based on the 
idea of individual saving. The idea is that individuals would save for their own 
unemployment benefit instead of participating in a collective insurance 
arrangement. The reasoning behind introducing an individualised financing 
system for unemployment benefits is that it would stimulate people to work and 
not use benefits. The idea has been seriously discussed in the Netherlands within 
the framework of reforms of the welfare state.  
We are unable to account for behavioural effects in our simulations. Our 
approach implies that we use the transition probabilities from the previous 
simulations and assume that: 
− people save for unemployment benefits if they work; 
− have to finance their income during periods of unemployment from the 
amount of money saved up to that moment. 
 
The results indicate that the savings variant is totally unrealistic. Most people 
have not saved enough when they become unemployed and most have money left 
over at pension age. It is difficult to imagine that the behavioural effects would 
be such that one could avoid that large number are deployed from a benefit when 
they need one. Perhaps if the scheme were to apply to a limited percentage of the 
benefit only, the main part still accounted for collectively, one might consider it. 
However, then the scheme may not be that effective in inducing behavioural 
effects that reduce the use of benefits. 
The second simulation deals with the impact of the business cycle. During 
recession periods, when in particular young people have difficulties finding a job, 
there is concern about the possibility of a lost generation. The fear is that young 
people entering the labour market as unemployed, and subsequently becoming 
long-term unemployed, will suffer from an unstable work life. In the base-line 
scenario there is no business-cycle variation. However, on the basis of the 
original data, that, as was earlier indicated, cover the period 1989-2000, we could 
analyse the impact of the business cycle on the transition probabilities.  
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Then a new simulation was carried out based on the following assumptions: 
a. During the first years in the labour market the cohort is confronted with a 
recession leading to lower chances to find a job and higher chances of 
losing one’s job once employed, compared to the baseline simulation. 
b. After this period the recession turns into a booming period of similar length, 
during which job chances are high and the risk of becoming unemployed is 
low. 
c. After this booming period the labour market gets back to ´normal´ and 
remains so during the rest of the period. 
 
The results show no sign of a lost generation. The bad start is completely 
compensated for by the booming period that follows the recession. The 
simulation is not entirely satisfactory as already before the age of 25 the share of 
the employed is higher than in the baseline simulation. One would expect a lower 
employment share during this phase of the life course. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that our simulation deals with a single cohort. If we were to include 
different cohorts, it is still possible that the cohort with the bad start has 
difficulties to compete with previous and later cohorts with a good start. 
However, our results suggest that as long as the number of jobs generated during 
the booming period is large enough to absorb (almost) everybody, there may not 
be much of a problem. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the report we use micro panel data for the Netherlands to estimate multinomial 
logit models for the transition probabilities between work, the various types of 
social benefits and inactivity without a benefit. Then these models are used to 
simulate complete life courses for a cohort of individuals. The simulations serve 
a number of purposes. First, we use them to study the concentration in work and 
the use of benefits. Are unemployment and disability more or less evenly spread 
over the potential labour force if we follow individuals over their whole life 
course or is it more or less the same people who use benefits all of the time? 
Second, the simulations are used to get insight into two important policy issues. 
The first issue under discussion is whether it is feasible to develop a system of 
unemployment benefits based on the idea of individual savings. The second issue 
has become relevant again under the influence of the recent sharp increase in 
youth unemployment. Similarly as in the 1980s, the government has prioritised 
the fight against youth unemployment under the assumption that young people 
faced with long-term unemployment will constitute a lost generation. With our 
simulation model we can analyse to what extent unemployment after leaving 
school affects future work lives. 
Studies on unemployment and disability usually concentrate on one-period 
analyses. On the basis of such analyses it can for example be inferred which 
factors and individual characteristics determine benefit duration. However, such 
analyses have only limited meaning for the social and budgetary significance of 
benefits. If a person uses benefits only once during his life course and has jobs 
for the remaining part of his working-age period, there might not be a big 
problem, even if the benefit period is longer than a year which is usually seen as 
problematic by policy makers. It is much more of a problem when individuals 
face a number of benefit periods during their life course. Short benefit periods are 
usually not seen as a problem, but frequent short spells may add up to a 
substantial share of the total working-age period. 
In duration analysis it is often found that hazard rates depend on the time a 
person has already spent in a specific situation. The longer unemployed a person 
is, the lower hazard rates tend to be. The lower chances of finding a job partly 
coincide with changes in benefit regime that occur when individuals stay in 
unemployment long. Most people that become unemployed, that is the ones that 
worked sufficiently long, initially receive unemployment insurance benefits. But 
after some time, this benefit expires and then people have to rely on social 
assistance. However, unemployment may also have spill-over effects to future 
transitions. If a person has found a job after having been unemployed, he might 
be more vulnerable to renewed unemployment during the first years in 
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employment. That would imply that unemployment is causing future 
unemployment. This might be a factor adding to the concentration in the use of 
benefits. 
Personal characteristics can also be expected to play a role. Factors such as age, 
gender, education and ethnic origin are likely to affect both the chance of losing a 
job and the chance of finding one, once being in a situation of unemployment or 
disability. Therefore, the pattern of work, use of benefits and inactivity without a 
benefit is expected to vary according to gender, age and education. Furthermore, 
the degree to which people work and use benefits vary over their life course. 
In addition to the factors mentioned there is probably also a considerable random 
component in the variation in life course patterns between individuals. The fact 
that one person gets unemployed several times during his life, while another 
person stays in employment throughout his working-age life may in some cases 
be due to accidental factors. 
The report deals with the following research questions: 
1. Is the use of benefits over the life course evenly spread over individuals or 
does a minority of the potential labour force account for most of the use? 
2. If the use of benefits is concentrated on a relatively small group of people, 
is this due to differences in personal characteristics, self-sustaining effects 
of unemployment owing to duration dependency and/or future chances of 
unemployment affected by current unemployment, or to random effects? 
3. Does the answers to 1) and 2) differ between the various types of benefits? 
4. Is more use of one type of benefit completely or partially compensated by 
less use of other types of benefits or do we see a cumulating use of 
benefits? 
5. How does the total use of benefits during the life course relate to the total 
number of years worked?  
6. What would be the result if a system would be introduced according to 
which people were to save part of their benefit? 
7. If the labour market situation is bad when young people enter the labour 
market, to what extent does this have lasting effects on their labour market 
situation? 
 
We have found only few examples of longitudinal studies that provide 
information on these questions. In a previous study De Koning, Van Nes and Van 
der Veen (1998) already made an attempt to develop a simulation model for life 
courses. The results of this study point to considerable concentration of 
unemployment. Approximately one-third of the total amount of unemployment 
experienced by a cohort of individuals is accounted for by the 10 per cent of the 
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cohort that have the highest life-time unemployment. Life-time unemployment 
for an individual is defined as the sum total of all the unemployment spells 
experienced by the individual during his work life. The total amount of 
unemployment experienced by a cohort is then derived by adding up the life-time 
unemployment of the individuals in the cohort. This concentration can partly be 
explained by the fact that some groups (the lower educated, for example) are 
unemployed more often and longer than others. However, even if we look at 
relatively homogeneous groups unemployment concentration is considerable. 
Both duration-dependence, cumulating unemployment (the fact that a current 
unemployment period affects future job chances negatively), and random factors 
give rise to this phenomenon. 
This previous study has a number of drawbacks, however. The transition 
probabilities between work, unemployment and ‘other’ were derived from 
aggregated tables. Furthermore, this distinction between three situations is too 
simple. In reality several types of social benefits exists (unemployment insurance 
benefits, social assistance benefits, disability benefits and early (or pre-) 
retirement benefits. 
De Koning, Van Nes and Van der Veen find some evidence for cumulating 
unemployment. What does the international literature say on this subject? From 
an international perspective we know of an older study by Heckman and Borjas 
in which they analyse the question whether current unemployment increases the 
chance of future unemployment (Heckman and Borjas, 1980). In this study no 
evidence of this type of cumulative unemployment is found. Lynch (1985 and 
1989) comes to the same conclusion. Omori (1997) on the other hand does find 
evidence that the hazard rate from current unemployment depends on previous 
unemployment. He attributes this effect to ‘stigma’. Arranz and Muro (2004) 
draw a similar conclusion on the basis of their research. On the whole, the 
literature is rather unclear about this effect. 
The report is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the dataset that was 
used to develop the simulation model. Then section 3 discusses the modelling 
and estimation of the transition probabilities. Finally, section 4 treats the 
simulation model and the outcomes of the simulations. 
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2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
2.1 THE IPO PANEL 
The panel starts in 1989 and consists of a representative sample of the Dutch 
population of 65.000 individuals. The sample is drawn from the tax registers and 
monitored between 1989 and 2000 on a continuous basis. The data are based on 
the information provided to the tax office each year. It contains the starting and 
ending dates of periods during which people held jobs or had a benefit1. 
Furthermore, data on the income obtained during each period is available. By 
linking the data to information from municipal administrations a number of 
personal characteristics could be added. The following individual characteristics 
are available: age, gender and ethnic origin2.  
As the panel data are of administrative origin, there is no attrition owing to non-
response or withdrawal. However, during the panel period some individuals 
leave the panel owing to death or emigration. These are replaced by newborn and 
immigrants, respectively.  As we only deal with the people in active age, people 
may enter our dataset during the period 1989-2000 because of immigration or 
reaching the age of 15. They may leave our dataset during the period owing to 
death, emigration or reaching the (official) pension age of 65. Hence, some of the 
people in the dataset are only in it for part of the period 1989-2000. People who 
participated in the panel for less than one year have been excluded from the 
analysis. In total, the panel involves around 80.000 people, some of whom are 
only part of the 1989-2000 period in the panel. 
Of these people we know when and for how long they had a job or a social 
benefit, and when and for how long they have been inactive. The following types 
of benefits are distinguished:  
− unemployment benefit; 
− social assistance benefit;  
− disability benefit;  
− sickness benefit;  
− early retirement/pre-retirement benefit.  
                                                     
1 When a situation continues to exist over the year, the relevant spells are merged. 
2 Also household characteristics are available as well as the sector in which a person works 
(the latter however only for a couple of years), but these are not exploited in our analyses. 
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Furthermore, a number of combinations of these situations are possible. When, 
for example, a company is confronted with a sudden decline in its sales owing to 
special circumstances out of its control, there is the possibility that its workers 
obtain an unemployment benefit while they stay employed with the company. 
Educational attainment is not available. However, we have estimated educational 
attainment using the income data in the panel. The underlying assumption is that 
there is a strong relationship between wage level and educational attainment. The 
wage data in the panel are cumulative data in the sense that we know wages per 
time period. We have computed daily wages by dividing cumulative income 
during the working periods of a person by the number of days in these periods. 
This daily wage was then used as a dependent variable in a linear regression with 
age and gender as independent variables (see appendix 1). Normally, people with 
a given educational attainment earn more the older they are, which makes it 
necessary to correct for age. Gender affects wages both by the gender gap and the 
fact that many women work part-time. The number of hours worked is 
unfortunately not in the database. The residuals are considered as indicators for 
educational attainment. People have been divided in three groups according to 
the level of the residuals corresponding to them. The threshold values have been 
chosen in such a way that the shares of the three resulting groups correspond 
more or less with the shares of the low educated, the secondary educated and the 
high educated. People are assumed to be low educated if they fall in the first 
group, secondary educated if they fall in the second group and high educated if 
they fall in the third group. Of course this is a rough approximation, but later in 
the report we will see that it produces results that are quite reasonable in terms of 
differences in employment and unemployment patterns. 
2.2 COMPOSITION OF THE PANEL COMPARED TO THE TOTAL DUTCH 
WORKING-AGE POPULATION 
How did the labour market develop during the panel period, how are the various 
groups represented in the panel and how does the panel’s composition compare 
to that of the total Dutch working-age population?  These are the questions we 
deal with in this section. 
Table 2.1 gives the shares of the Dutch working-age population in the various 
income situations. This table gives the reader an indication of the labour market 
trends during the period 1989-1999. The table shows that during the 1990s the 
share of those with a job has increased. Initially, also the share of persons 
claiming unemployment insurance benefits increased, but from 1995 on it 
diminished, reflecting the business cycle movement. The share of social 
assistance beneficiaries has continuously diminished, while the share of disabled 
shows a cyclical pattern: until 1993 it increases, and then it declines until 1996, 
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followed by a new increase that lasts until the end of the period. The 
development in the use of sickness benefits is strongly affected by changes in 
legislation. Both in 1994 and 1996 the period during which employers carry the 
burden of sickness benefits has been lengthened, thereby reducing the number of 
sickness days paid for collectively. 
Table 2.1 also contains the corresponding figures for the IPO panel. The IPO 
figures in the table are ultimo year stock figures. From the table we can conclude 
that regarding employment, unemployment insurance and social assistance both 
the levels and the development between the national figures and the IPO figures 
is good to reasonably good. The fact that there is a difference in levels with 
respect to unemployment insurance may be due to the fact that in some situations 
an unemployment insurance benefit can be combined with another source of 
income. With respect to social assistance it is unclear what the difference could 
explain. 
With respect to disability and sickness benefits the differences are more 
profound. However, here we can give clear explanations. In quite a number of 
cases disability benefits are paid through the former employer. This is for 
example the case when disabled people are given the opportunity to work in view 
of a possible return to a regular job. In the national data this is then counted as a 
disability benefit while in the panel it is counted as wage income.  Disability 
benefits are also often paid through the employer in case of disabled workers 
employed by social companies, which provide sheltered employment to severely 
handicapped people. The fact that IPO figures on sickness benefits are much 
lower than the official figures is caused by the fact that in IPO sickness periods 
are not counted if they happen in a job. IPO treats the latter case as an 
uninterrupted job. Evidently, most sickness benefits are paid to workers. 
Summing up we think that the IPO panel gives a reasonable representation of the 
developments in the Dutch labour market between 1989 and 2000. The main 
deviation from reality is the relatively low incidence of disability benefits in the 
panel. As was indicated previously, this is probably due to the fact that in IPO 
part of the disability benefits are counted as wages. But then we would expect 
that the share of employed persons in the panel was higher than in the national 
figures, which is not the case. Probably, this had to do with administrative 
mistakes. In case of a transition from, for example, a benefit to a job, the benefit 
spell and the job spell are not always administrated as subsequent periods. Then 
it looks as if there is a period of non-income in between. In the panel this leads to 
an overestimation of the share of people without a (personal) income. However, 
we believe that these deviations do not influence the basic patterns of work, use 
of benefits and no income periods. 
A disadvantage of the panel is that it contains no recent data. It should be noted, 
however, that the period 1989-2000 is a ´normal´ period in which, for example, 
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unemployment rates comparable with the current level can be observed, but also 
lower rates. The most important drawback is that since 2000 several changes 
have occurred in labour market institutions that may have affected labour market 
transitions. In that sense the patterns emerging from the panel may not 
completely reflect the current situation.  
Table 2.2 below gives the IPO figures for the period 1989-1999. From the table 
we can conclude that during this period the share of the employed has risen 
considerably (from 55 to 63 per cent), while the share of those without income 
has correspondingly declined (from 24 to 17 per cent). The use of social benefits 
as a whole has remained relatively constant with a decrease of only a few 
percentage points (from 20 to 19 per cent). 
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Table 2.1 The Dutch working-age population divided according to type of income, 1989-1999 (end of year stock values) 
Percentages of the working-age population with a specific type of income 
Wage incomea)  Unemployment insurance 
benefit (WW, per ultimo 
year) 
Social Assistance 
benefit ( per ultimo 
year) 
Disability benefit 
(per ultimo year) 
Sickness benefit  
Year 
National 
data 
(yearly 
averages) 
Panel 
(ultimo 
year) 
National 
data 
Panel National 
data 
Panel National 
data 
Panel National 
data 
(daily 
averages) 
Panel( per 
ultimo year) 
Total 
working-age 
population 
(in 
thousands; 
per ultimo 
year))  
 
Total 
number of 
persons in 
panel( per 
ultimo year) 
1989 54% 55% 2,1% 2,0% 5,9% 5,7% 8,2% 5,9% 2,6% 0,5% 10,300  65.0 
1990 55% 56% 2,0% 2,1% 5,5% 5,6% 8,5% 5,6% 2,8% 0,5% 10,300 62.6 
1991 56% 58% 2,0% 2,3% 4,9% 5,5% 8,7% 5,7% 2,8% 0,4% 10,300 62.9 
1992 57% 58% 2,4% 3,0% 4,8% 5,4% 8,7% 5,7% 2,8% 0,4% 10,300 63.0 
1993 57% 57% 3,2% 3,4% 4,7% 5,5% 8,8% 5,7% 2,8% 0,5% 10,300 64.4 
1994 57% 58% 3,9% 3,7% 4,8% 5,5% 8,5% 5,5% 1,6% 0,4% 10,300 64.2 
1995 58% 59% 3,7% 3,7% 4,6% 5,4% 8,2% 5,7% 1,6% 0,5% 10,300 65.1 
1996 59% 60% 3,5% 3,9% 4,5% 5,1% 8,2% 5,9% 0,4% 0,4% 10,300 65.2 
1997 60% 62% 3,1% 2,8% 4,1% 5,0% 8,3% 6,7% 0,9% 0,4% 10,300 65.2 
1998 62% 63% 2,7% 2,1% 3,7% 4,6% 8,5% 6,3% 1,0% 0,5% 10,300 64.9 
1999 64% 63% 2,1% 1,7% 3,4% 4,3% 8,6% 6,7% 1,0% 0,4% 10,300 66.2 
a) For those working at least 12 hours per week. 
b) Consists of a number of different arrangements (WAO, AAW, Wajong and WAZ). 
Sources:  CBS Statline and IPO panel.
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Table 2.2 The division of persons in the age of 15-65 years over the various income situations according to the IPO-panel, 1989-1999 
(stocks at the end of the year) 
Year Employed Unemployment 
insurance benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Sickness 
benefit 
Pensions 
and early 
retirement  
Other 
pensions 
No 
(personal 
income) 
Unknown Total Total number 
of persons in 
panel 
1989 55% 2,0% 5,7% 5,9% 0,5% 4,6% 1,6% 24% 0,7% 100% 65.058 
1990 56% 2,1% 5,6% 5,6% 0,5% 4,6% 1,6% 23% 0,9% 100% 62.551 
1991 58% 2,3% 5,5% 5,7% 0,4% 4,6% 1,5% 22% 0,5% 100% 62.876 
1992 58% 3,0% 5,4% 5,7% 0,4% 4,5% 1,5% 21% 0,6% 100% 63.022 
1993 57% 3,4% 5,5% 5,7% 0,5% 4,7% 1,5% 21% 0,5% 100% 64.362 
1994 58% 3,7% 5,5% 5,5% 0,4% 4,7% 1,5% 20% 0,4% 100% 64.222 
1995 59% 3,7% 5,4% 5,7% 0,5% 4,8% 1,5% 19% 0,2% 100% 65.101 
1996 60% 3,9% 5,1% 5,9% 0,4% 4,8% 1,5% 18% 0,3% 100% 65.200 
1997 62% 2,8% 5,0% 6,7% 0,4% 4,2% 1,4% 17% 0,2% 100% 65.177 
1998 63% 2,1% 4,6% 6,3% 0,5% 4,2% 1,3% 18% 0,2% 100% 64.921 
1999 63% 1,7% 4,3% 6,7% 0,4% 4,3% 1,3% 17% 0,7% 100% 66.219 
Source:  IPO-panel 1989-2000. 
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2.3 PATTERNS OF WORK, USE OF SOCIAL BENEFITS AND NONINCOME 
PERIODS OVER THE PANEL PERIOD 
Although the purpose of the report is to construct life course data, it is already 
interesting to show results for the panel period, which is relatively long. First, for 
each individual we have computed the total time spent in a job during the panel 
period by adding up the individual job spells. The same was done for benefit 
spells and spells in inactivity without a personal income. Then the percentage 
shares of the three situations were –again for each individual – computed. The 
results are given by table 2.3. From the table we can see that 27 percent of the 
individuals constantly had a job during the time they participated in the panel, 
while 20 percent never had a job. Not less than 43 percent of the people aged 
between 15 and 65 did receive a social benefit for at least some of the time3. 
However, in terms of the time spent during the panel period, the percentage share 
of social benefits is relatively small: only seven per cent. 
Of the panel members 17 percent received an unemployment insurance benefit 
for at least some time. Due to the limited duration of unemployment insurance 
benefits and its dependence on the number of years worked, almost nobody had 
such a benefit during the whole period. Depending on age and the number of 
years worked the maximum duration of an unemployment benefit is seven years. 
Therefore only people who participated in the panel for seven years or less can 
get an unemployment benefit during the whole period. These are mainly older, 
unemployed people that reach the age of 65 and therefore leave the panel. 
Table 2.3 What percentage of the period 1989-2000 did individuals spent in a job, a 
social benefit and/or inactivity without a personal income? 
Percentage of time in each 
situation 
Job Inactivity Social 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
0 percent 20% 58% 57% 83% 
1-50 percent 20% 21% 27% 17% 
51-99 percent 33% 10% 10% 0.3% 
100 percent 27% 11% 7% 0.1% 
Number of individuals 79,288 79,288 79,288 79,288 
Source: IPO 1989-2000. 
 
                                                     
3 Note that age is measured by year of birth.  
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Table 2.4 gives us an idea of the mobility in the labour market. About one third 
of the panel has only one type of income during the panel period, also one third 
has two or three different periods/situations and the remaining part has more than 
three different periods. Approximately 50 per cent of those that worked at least 
for some time during the panel period, held more than one job; 20 per cent even 
more than 3 jobs. The percentage with multiple spells in a social benefit is 
similar to the results for jobs, but situations with more than 3 spells in a benefit 
occur less frequently. Inactivity without a personal income is mostly a one-spell 
phenomenon.  
Table 2.4 How many periods did individuals spend in a job, social benefit and/or 
inactivity during the period 1989-2000? 
Number of periods in each 
situation 
Job Inactivity Social benefit Total number of 
periods 
None 20% 58% 57% - 
1 period 40% 35% 22% 36% 
2 periods 15% 6% 11% 18% 
3 periods 9% 1% 5% 13% 
> 3 periods 16% 0.1% 5% 34% 
Number of individuals 79,288 79,288 79,288 79,288 
Source: IPO 1989-2000. 
 
By combining the division of time over the various situations and the number of 
spells in each situation, we can determine certain patterns in the use of jobs, 
social benefits and inactivity. This results in a number of typologies (table 2.5). 
The majority of the panel members worked during their whole stay in the panel 
or during most of their stay. About 17 percent received a social benefit most of 
the time, while 18 percent can be characterised as (mainly) inactive without an 
income. Finally, 8 percent switches between jobs, inactivity and social benefits. 
To what extent do the types of benefits used differ between groups that are 
different as to their patterns of work, use of benefits and inactivity without 
income? People that worked most of the time but also made considerable use of 
social benefits often received an unemployment benefit. In addition, the group 
with at least 6 transitions often gets a social assistance benefit. Furthermore, 
people that received a social benefit during the whole period most often received 
a disability benefit, followed by a social assistance benefit or early retirement 
benefit. The group of people receiving a social benefit most of the time, but at the 
same time experiencing other situations during their stay in the panel, shows the 
most variety in use of social benefits. About one third of this group also received 
an unemployment benefit, almost 50 percent received also a social assistance 
benefit and 40 percent received also a disability and/or early retirement benefit. 
Patterns of work and use of benefits over the life course 
12 
The group of people with a mix of situations and less than 5 transitions in total 
often received a social assistance benefit in case of unemployment. The group of 
people with at least 5 transitions tend to use both unemployment insurance 
benefits and social assistance benefits. 
Table 2.5 Typologies of panel members on the basis of their history of employment, 
use of social benefits and inactivity without job during their stay in the panel 
Patterns ranked by main activity % of total 
Job  
Always worked with the same employers 21% 
Always worked but with several employers 6% 
Mainly1 worked, never a social benefit 11% 
Mainly worked, did have social benefit(s), less than 6 transitions in total 11% 
Mainly worked, did have social benefit(s), at least 6 transitions in total 8% 
subtotal 57% 
Social benefit  
Always the same social benefit 5% 
Mainly one type of social benefit, but also one other situation (either 
work, benefit or inactivity) 
4% 
Mainly social benefit(s), also several other situations  8% 
subtotal 17% 
Inactivity  
Always inactive 11% 
Mainly inactive, but also working for sometime 7% 
subtotal 18% 
Other  
Mix of social benefit(s), labour and inactivity, less than 5 transitions in 
total 
4% 
Mix of social benefit(s), labour and inactivity, at least 5 transitions in 
total 
4% 
subtotal 8% 
Other 1% 
Total 100% 
Number of individuals 79,288 
1  The word ‘mainly’ refers to: ’51 – 99 percent of the total amount of time someone participated in 
the panel’. 
Source:  income panel data 1989-2000. 
 
Table 2.6 shows the composition of the different typologies according to 
personal characteristics. Gender differences are most apparent concerning 
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inactivity without income. Women tend to have more periods of inactivity. Men 
can be found somewhat more in typologies with work as the main activity. 
Differences between young and older people seem to be mostly related to 
mobility: older people are overrepresented in typologies with only one situation, 
while younger people tend to be more concentrated in typologies with a high 
number of transitions. The same seems to be the case for non-native people. They 
appear more often in classes with several different situations, especially when 
these situations involve the use of one or more social benefits. Educational 
attainment influences the chances of being employed: people with a low 
educational indication are less often employed and more often in a situation of 
inactivity without (personal) income or benefit dependence. 
Table 2.6 Characteristics of different typologies based on the panel members´ 
histories regarding employment, use of social benefits and inactivity without 
income in 1989-2000 
Patterns ranked by main activity Male Aged 40 years or 
older in 1989 
Native Educational 
indication: low 
Job     
Always worked with the same employers 69% 34% 89% 16% 
Always worked but with several employers 57% 10% 87% 26% 
Mainly1 worked, never a social benefit 45% 8% 86% 32% 
Mainly worked, did have social benefit(s), less than 
6 transitions in total 62% 37% 84% 28% 
Mainly worked, did have social benefit(s), at least 6 
transitions in total 57% 8% 81% 26% 
Social benefit     
Always the same social benefit 60% 82% 82% - 1 
Mainly one type of social benefit, but also one other 
situation (either work, benefit or inactivity) 54% 82% 82% 51% 
Mainly social benefit(s), also several other 
situations  54% 54% 71% 68% 
Inactivity     
Always inactive 15% 61% 77% - 1 
Mainly inactive, but also working for sometime 31% 14% 80% 53% 
Other     
Mix of social benefit(s), labour and inactivity, less 
than 5 transitions in total 43% 47% 75% 56% 
Mix of social benefit(s), labour and inactivity, at 
least 5 transitions in total 44% 13% 73% 48% 
Total panel 51% 34% 82% 33% 
1  Educational attainment can only be approximated for people that had a job for some time during 
the panel period since it is based on earned income. 
Source:  IPO 1989-2000. 
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3 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
3.1 OUTLINE OF OUR APPROACH 
The IPO dataset provides us with the labour market histories of a large number of 
individuals. For each of them we know the sequence of spells in employment, 
various types of benefits and inactivity without income. In order to make the 
analysis of the data more tractable, we have constructed individual quarterly data 
from the original dataset. Using the original data we simply looked at the 
situation at the end of each quarter. Hence we have 48 data points for individuals 
that have been panel members for the whole period. With this data we can then 
analyse transitions between employment, use of benefits and inactivity without 
(personal) income.  
This data is then used to estimate models for the transition probabilities by using 
econometric methods. The models determine the probabilities that a person stays 
in the same situation or makes the transition to one of the other situations. Such 
models are estimated for the following starting situations: employment, 
unemployment insurance, social assistance and inactivity. For the other situations 
the transition probabilities have been computed by taking the sample averages 
differentiated by age, gender and ethnic origin. For some of the other starting 
situations (disability, pensions) econometric models are less relevant as 
transitions from these situations do not occur or only rarely. The remaining 
situations cover only a small percentage of the total time during the panel. 
The simulation results we will present in the next chapter are mostly based on the 
econometric models (supplemented with transition probabilities based on the 
sample probabilities for some transitions). However, we also made a simulation 
on the basis of transition probabilities solely based on sample averages. In the 
next section we discuss these transition probabilities based on sample averages. 
Then the model specification and the model estimations are discussed in section 
3.3.     
3.2 TRANSITION PROBABILITIES BASED ON SAMPLE AVERAGES 
We use the IPO data to determine the situation of each panel member at the end 
of each quarter. By comparing the situation at the end of quarter t with it 
situation at the end of t+1, we can identify transitions. For each social group 
(defined by gender, age, ethnic origin and educational indication) we compute 
the percentage staying in a given situation and the percentages moving to a 
different situation by taking the sample averages. These percentages are also 
referred to as transition probabilities. In this section we discuss the outcomes. 
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The following situations are distinguished in the computations4: 
− job; 
− unemployment benefit; 
− social assistance benefit;  
− disability benefit;  
− sickness benefit;  
− early retirement/pre-retirement benefit; 
− inactivity; 
− job in combination with an unemployment benefit; 
− job in combination with a disability benefit. 
Inactivity 
On average the probability of remaining inactive from one quarter to another is 
96 percent (see first line of table 3.1). Men have a higher probability of finding a 
job from inactivity than women (7 percent for men against 3 percent for 
women).Young inactive people also have a relatively high chance of finding a 
job. This is mainly caused by those who find a job after leaving school. Ethnic 
origin does not seem to influence transition probabilities from inactivity. People 
with a high or a secondary education (note that the level of education has been 
estimated; see also appendix 1) have a slightly higher chance of making the 
transition from inactivity to employment than people with a low education (7 
percent against 5 percent). 
Job 
The average probability of keeping one’s job from one quarter to another is 98 
percent. This percentage does not differ much between men and women. The 
probability of staying employed slightly increases with age until older age (55 
years of age). Then it becomes considerably lower in favour of (early) retirement. 
For people of Dutch origin and for people with a higher education the chance of 
keeping one’s job is somewhat higher than average.  
                                                     
4  Job-to-job mobility is not taken into consideration. Therefore, subsequent jobs count as one 
period of employment. The reason for not taking job-to-job mobility into account is that we 
were not sure whether individual job durations were sufficiently accurately measured in the 
data. 
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Unemployment benefit 
The average probability of remaining in an unemployment insurance benefit is 73 
percent. Approximately 12 percent of the unemployed has a job next quarter, 
while 8 per cent is then in a situation of combining a job with unemployment 
benefit. Male unemployed have a somewhat higher chance of finding a job than 
females: 13 percent against 10 percent. The same is true for the transition to 
social assistance, although for this transition the differences between the sexes 
are even smaller. Women, on the other hand have higher chances on going into 
inactivity without income.  
The probability of continued unemployment increases with age: it is 43 percent 
for the group aged between 15 and 25 years and no less than 95 percent for the 
group aged older than 54 years. A reverse pattern exists for the transition 
probability from unemployment to employment: it declines from 30 percent for 
young people (15-25 years) to only 1 percent for older people (over 55). Also the 
chances to go to social assistance or to a situation with both a job and an 
unemployment benefit decrease with age. 
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Table 3.1 Transitions probabilities from one quarter to another 
 Distribution in quarter t +1         
Situation in 
quarter t 
Inactivity Job Early 
retireme
nt 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemploy
ment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Job 
combined 
with 
disability 
benefit 
Job combined 
with un-
employment 
benefit 
Other 
pensions 
Total 
Inactivity 95.79% 3.43% 0.07% 0.01% 0.09% 0.02% 0.41% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 100% 
Job 0.63% 97.62% 0.19% 0.13% 0.07% 0.47% 0.18% 0.08% 0.12% 0.43% 0.01% 100% 
early retirement 0.19% 0.92% 97.96% 0.00% 0.41% 0.06% 0.06% 0.19% 0.02% 0.01% 0.11% 100% 
Sickness benefit 2.95% 12.79% 0.14% 58.79% 11.21% 8.01% 2.02% 0.16% 0.63% 1.47% 0.08% 100% 
Disability benefit 0.23% 0.17% 0.09% 0.02% 98.07% 0.24% 0.09% 0.02% 0.90% 0.02% 0.05% 100% 
Unemployment 
benefit 1.32% 11.61% 0.30% 1.57% 0.25% 72.42% 2.69% 0.19% 0.03% 8.10% 0.06% 100% 
Social assistance 
benefit 1.06% 4.10% 0.03% 0.05% 0.13% 0.08% 93.99% 0.08% 0.01% 0.03% 0.09% 100% 
unknown situation 1.59% 13.75% 1.53% 0.22% 0.24% 0.86% 0.71% 80.03% 0.03% 0.23% 0.04% 100% 
Job combined with 
disability benefit 0.08% 3.28% 0.13% 0.04% 6.20% 0.13% 0.03% 0.01% 89.74% 0.32% 0.02% 100% 
Job combined with 
unemployment 
benefit 0.16% 24.72% 0.11% 0.50% 0.07% 10.82% 0.65% 0.09% 0.13% 62.61% 0.01% 100% 
Other pensions 0.05% 0.14% 0.32% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.05% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 99.35% 100% 
Total (percentage) 19.92% 53.44% 3.08% 0.26% 5.05% 1.48% 4.96% 0.37% 0.94% 0.95% 1.15% 100% 
Total (in numbers) 561.350 1.505.880 86.698 7.306 142.189 41.740 139.763 10.295 26.403 26.864 32.392 2.817.810 
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Non-natives originating from a Western country have a slightly lower chance of 
finding a job from unemployment (9.7 percent against 12 percent for natives and 
11.3 for non-natives from Non-Western countries). Non-natives originating from 
Non-Western countries have a lower chance of staying in an unemployment 
benefit. This is caused by the fact that they have higher chances of going from an 
unemployment benefit to a social assistance benefit.  
Finally, people with a low education have a lower chance on finding a job from 
unemployment and a higher chance of moving to a social assistance benefit 
compared to people with a higher education. 
Social assistance benefit 
The average probability of staying in social assistance the next quarter is 94 
percent. This probability is slightly higher for women while men claiming social 
assistance have a higher chance of finding a job. As people get older their chance 
of staying in a social assistance benefit increases. Young social assistance 
claimants on the other hand have higher chances of finding a job (11 percent for 
the group aged between 15 and 25 years against 0.2 percent for the group aged 
older than 55). Ethnic origin does not seem to influence transition probabilities 
from social assistance. 
People with a low educational indication have a higher chance on staying in 
social assistance than people with a secondary or higher education. This is 
mainly caused by the fact that the latter have higher chances of finding a job. 
Disability benefit 
The average probability for people claiming a disability benefit at quarter t still 
having one at time t+1 is 98 percent. Neither this probability nor the other 
transition probabilities from disability seem to differ much between the various 
social groups. The probability of staying in a disability benefit is slightly 
increasing with age (from 95 percent for the group aged between 15 and 25 years 
to 99 percent for the group aged over 54). Young people with a disability benefit 
have a relatively high chance of combining a job with a disability benefit. 
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Other situations 
The average probability of keeping a sickness benefit is 59 percent. The main 
transition probabilities are: job (13 percent), disability benefit (11 percent) and 
unemployment benefit (8 percent). Women have somewhat higher chances of 
moving to inactivity. Young people have higher chances of going from a sickness 
benefit to a job again, while older people have a high chance of keeping their 
sickness benefit. Natives have a higher chance of finding a job while non-
European non-natives more often move to social assistance. 
The average probability of staying in a situation in which a job is combined 
with an unemployment benefit is 63 percent.  This probability is highest for 
older and native people. The probability of moving to an unemployment benefit 
(without a job) is 11 percent while the probability of moving to a job (without 
unemployment benefit) is 25 percent. This last probability decreases with age. 
Of those that combine a job with a disability benefit 90 percent stays in this 
situation the next quarter. Women and young people have higher chances of 
moving to other situations, mostly to a job or a to disability benefit (not 
combined with any of the other situations).  
Overall transition patterns 
Summing up, we conclude that in general men, people of Dutch origin and 
people with a higher education have higher probabilities of staying in their job 
and also of finding one from inactivity or unemployment. Age is an important 
determinant of the probabilities that one stays in the same situation. Older people 
tend to stay longer in the same situation, while young people generally have 
higher chances of moving from any given situation to a job. 
3.3 MODEL APPROACH 
3.3.1 SPECIFICATION 
Instead of computing the transition probabilities directly from the data as we did 
in the previous section, it is also possible to specify mathematical formulas for 
them in which they are made dependent on the background characteristics. This 
makes it possible for us to test for the relevance of two phenomena: 
− Duration dependency: this refers to the phenomenon that the duration of 
staying in a certain situation influences the probability of moving to another 
situation. For example, the longer someone stays unemployed the smaller 
his chances of getting a job again may get.  
− The influence of current unemployment on the transition probabilities from 
future spells: when a person has been unemployed it might increase the 
Patterns of work and use of benefits over the life course 
20 
chance of future unemployment. We refer to this phenomenon as the 
cumulative effect. 
 
These phenomena are relevant as they may lead to a pattern where more or less 
the same people suffer from unemployment all the time. 
We use multinomial logit models to model the transition probabilities. The 
transition probability from situation i to situation j (j=1,….,N), P(i →j),  is then 
defined by: 
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In equation (1) ijβ  and z denote vectors for the coefficients and the independent 
variables, respectively.  For most of the transition probabilities the term zijβ   is 
defined as follows5: 
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The symbols used have the following meaning: 
d  =  duration of stay in situation i until date; 
p = vector of personal characteristics (age, gender, ethnic group and (estimated) 
level of education); 
The )(kijβ ’s are coefficients that must be estimated from the data. 
The fact that d is included implies that the transition probabilities are made 
dependent on duration. The fact that we use a quadratic form in d implies a fairly 
                                                     
5 We have also estimated models in which a business cycle indicator was added to the 
equation. We will come back to that in the next chapter when we analyse the effect of 
entering the labour market during a recession period. 
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general specification. It accounts for positive and negative duration dependence, 
as well as for changing duration dependence during the spell.  
The possibility of cumulative unemployment is modelled by the hypothesis that 
people in a job less than two years that have been unemployed before have a 
higher chance of losing the job than those without a previous unemployment 
experience. This leads to the following formula.  
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In which dum_bn takes the value 1 if job duration until date is shorter than 2 
years, and 0 if it is longer; dum_wl is equal to 1 if the person received an 
unemployment benefit or social assistance benefit for at least some time during 
the period prior to the job. 
As was already said these dummy variables are only included when estimating 
the transition probabilities from employment. It is also possible that previous 
unemployment influences transition probabilities from a present situation of 
unemployment. This however correlates with duration dependency in a complex 
manner and is therefore very difficult to separate. 
3.3.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In this section we examine more closely the estimation results for the transition 
probabilities from employment, from unemployment insurance, from social 
assistance and from inactivity without an income. The interpretation of the 
estimated coefficients as they directly appear from the multinomial logit model is 
not straightforward6. The reason is that the different transition probabilities 
associated with a given starting situation add up to 1 and hence depend on each 
other. For that reason it is customary to look at the quasi-elasticities. This quasi-
elasticity is defined as follows: 
x
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This quasi-elasticity represents the percentage point change in the transition 
probability as the result of a one percent change in the exogenous variable. If x is 
a dummy variable the quasi-elasticity is computed by taking the difference of the 
probability in case x is equal to 1 and the case where it is 0. This can be 
                                                     
6 The direct output of the logit analysis is presented in Appendix 2. 
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interpreted as the percentage point change in the transition probability if the 
dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. 
)0;()1;( =→−=→= xjiPxjiPQE             (6) 
The quasi-elasticity depends on the values of the other explanatory variables. 
Therefore it will be different for different types of persons. In this section we 
present the quasi-elasticities for a reference individual. A reference individual is 
defined as: male, 40 years old, of native origin and with a low education7. The 
definition of the reference person differs slightly between the different models as 
a result of the fact that the duration variable differs between the different 
situations. For example, the average duration of unemployment differs from the 
average duration of employment spells. In order to test whether the quasi-
elasticities for a reference person give us a good indication of the influence of the 
independent variables on transition probabilities we randomly changed values of 
the independent variables and computed quasi-elasticities for these different 
values. It appears that the quasi-elasticities for a reference person are not too 
different from the corresponding elasticities for other types of individuals. 
                                                     
7 Initially we used the term ´average person`, but that is hardly justified if it refers only to 
men. We thought of using the term `mean person´, which seems to be more appropriate when 
referring solely to men, but decided in the end to use the more neutral term ´reference 
person`. 
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Table 3.2 Quasi-elasticities: transitions from work 
Situation Inactivity Job Retirement Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Work+ 
disability 
benefit 
Work+ 
unemployment 
benefit 
Probability for reference person (a) 0.002 0.988 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 
Elasticities           
Age -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Age (quadratic term) 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Duration of working (in days) -0.003 0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Duration of working (in days, quadratic 
term) 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Female 0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Non-European non-native 0.000 -0.008 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 
European non-native 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Low educational indication 0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
High educational indication -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
Dummy with value 1 for person working 
less than two years until quarter of 
measurement and received an 
unemployment or social assistance 
benefit before that. -0.001 -0.030 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 
Dummy with value 1 for person working 
less than two years until quarter of 
measurement 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
a) A reference person is defined as: male, 40 years old, working for three years until quarter of measurement, native origin and a middle educational indication. 
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Results: transitions from employment 
Table 3.2 shows the transition probabilities for people in a job. The first row 
contains the probabilities for an reference person of remaining in the job or 
changing to the other situations. The other rows contain the quasi-elasticities. For 
example the probability for a woman to make the transition from employment to 
inactivity without income is 0.4 percent point higher than it is for a man. For the 
reference person (which is assumed to be a man) this probability is 0.2%.  So, for 
a woman with, apart from gender, the same characteristics it will be 0.6% (0.2% 
plus 0.4%).  
The probability of remaining in the job is 98.8 percent for our reference person 
(see first row of table 3.2). Although the transitions probabilities to other 
situations are very small they do tell us something about the relation between 
transitions and observed characteristics. Men have a higher probability of staying 
in the job than women. Figure 3.1 shows this probability for different ages 
(keeping other variables at their average value). The probability of remaining 
employed is fairly constant until the age of around 60. After this age there is a 
sharp decline which is mainly caused by early retirement. The chances on a 
transition from a job to unemployment or social assistance benefit are highest for 
non-natives, people with a low educational and people with that have only 
worked for a short period. 
Figure 3.1 Probability of staying employed for different age levels 
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As was explained earlier two dummy-variables are included to deal with 
cumulative unemployment. As can be seen from the first row of table 3.2 the 
probability for an average person of going from employment to an 
unemployment benefit is 0.3 percent. Someone who has worked less than two 
years and has been unemployed before, has a probability of 1.6 percent to go 
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from work to unemployment benefit (0.3 percent plus 1.3 percent). In addition, 
the probability of moving to a situation in which work is combined with an 
unemployment benefit is 1.4 percent. Altogether the probability of a transition 
from employment to unemployment is 2.4 percent higher for a person that has 
been unemployed before than for our reference person. This shows that previous 
periods of unemployment influence future unemployment. 
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Table 3.3 Quasi-elasticity’s: transitions from unemployment benefit 
Situation Inactivity Job Retirement Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Work+ 
disability 
benefit 
Work+ 
unemployment 
benefit 
Probability for reference person (a) 0.004 0.179 0.001 0.013 0.001 0.668 0.013 0.003 0.001 0.117 
Age -0.007 0.301 -0.002 0.026 0.000 -0.528 -0.117 -0.010 0.065 0.271 
Age (quadratic term) 0.000 -0.326 0.002 -0.018 0.000 0.559 0.039 0.002 -0.033 -0.227 
Duration of unemployment benefit (in 
days) 0.002 -0.073 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.077 0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.015 
Female 0.013 -0.094 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.096 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.021 
Non-European non-native -0.001 -0.062 -0.001 0.007 0.001 0.063 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.014 
European non-native 0.000 -0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 
Low educational indication 0.003 -0.044 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.009 
High educational indication -0.001 0.048 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.031 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.013 
a) An reference person is defined as: male, 40 years old, receiving unemployment benefit for one year until quarter of measurement, native origin and a middle 
educational indication. 
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Results: transitions from an unemployment insurance benefit 
In table 3.3 transition probabilities are shown for people that are receiving an 
unemployment insurance benefit. The probability of remaining in the same 
situation is 66.8 percent. Two other important destinations are employment (17.9 
percent) and employment in combination with an unemployment benefit (11.7 
percent).  
Women have a higher probability of remaining claimants of an unemployment 
insurance benefit than men. When they move to another situation they more often 
move to inactivity and less often to a job. Non-natives more often stay 
unemployed (unemployment, social assistance or disability benefit) than natives 
and less often move to a job or inactivity. The same pattern applies to people 
with a low education, while people with a high education tend to have exactly the 
opposite pattern. The higher one’s education is, the higher the chances of finding 
a job and the lower the chances of staying unemployed. 
Age has an important influence on the transitions from an unemployment 
insurance benefit to employment and to social assistance (see figure 3.2). The 
probability of staying in an unemployment benefit sharply increases with age. 
This increase is most pronounced for people between 30 and 50 years of age. 
Probabilities of going from unemployment benefit to work or to social assistance 
both decrease with age. 
The probability that claimants of an unemployment insurance benefit find a job 
declines the longer the person is already receiving this benefit. At the same time 
the chances of staying in an unemployment benefit or going to a social assistance 
benefit or a disability benefit increases. The probability of staying in an 
unemployment benefit as a function of duration is graphically represented in 
figure 3.3. This probability is approximately 60 percent for people that only 
recently became an unemployment insurance benefit claimant and it increases to 
75 per cent for a person claiming this type of benefit for already 10 years.  
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Figure 3.2 Transition probabilities of claimants of an unemployment insurance benefit 
to a number of destinations for different age levels 
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Figure 3.3 Probability of staying a claimant of an unemployment insurance benefit as a 
function of the time one is already receiving such a benefit 
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Results: transitions from social assistance 
For an reference person claiming assistance at quarter t the chance of still being 
in social assistance one quarter later is nearly 85 per cent (table 3.4). Also a 
considerable percentage (14 per cent) makes the transition from social assistance 
to employment. For women with otherwise similar characteristics the 
probabilities are somewhat different. The quasi-elasticities show that women 
have a higher probability of staying in social assistance, a higher chance of 
becoming inactive without income and a lower chance of getting a job. The 
picture is also markedly different for the higher educated. They have a 
considerably lower chance of staying in social assistance, while their chance of 
getting a job is a lot higher. Being of ethnic origin does not have a lot of 
influence on the transitions from social assistance. Also the role of duration 
dependence is relatively small. 
For young people the chance to stay in social assistance is approximately 80 per 
cent. This chance increases with age (figure 3.4). People aged above 55 years 
have more than 90 per cent chance of staying in social assistance. The transition 
probability from social assistance to a job shows an opposite pattern with age: the 
chance that a social assistance claimant finds a job decreases with age. 
Figure 3.4 Transition probabilities of claimants of social assistance benefit for different 
age levels 
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Results: transitions from inactivity 
There is 94 per cent likelihood that a reference person in inactivity is still in 
inactivity one quarter later. The transition probability to a job is the only one of 
some significance. Of the background variables one age seems to matter. 
The chance of staying inactive without a benefit is highest around the age of 50 
years. Younger people have higher chances of moving to a job while older people 
have higher chances of moving to an early retirement or disability benefit. 
Figure 3.5 Transition probabilities of inactive persons for different age levels 
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Table 3.4 Quasi-elasticities: transitions from a social assistance benefit 
Situation 
Inactivity Job Retirement 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Work+ 
disability 
benefit 
Work+ 
unemployment 
benefit 
Probability for reference person (a) 0.005 0.141 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.847 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Age -0.004 0.096 0.000 0.007 -0.006 0.006 -0.104 0.007 0.000 -0.001 
Age (quadratic term) 0.001 -0.124 0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.129 -0.004 0.000 0.000 
Duration of social assistance benefit (in 
days) -0.001 -0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Female 0.007 -0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.074 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Non-European non-native -0.001 -0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 
European non-native -0.001 -0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Low educational indication 0.001 -0.073 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 
High educational indication -0.001 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.113 0.003 0.000 0.000 
a) An reference person is defined as: male, 40 years old, receiving social assistance benefit for one year until quarter of measurement, native origin and a middle 
educational indication. 
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Table 3.5 Quasi-elasticities: transitions from inactivity 
Situation 
Inactivity Job Retirement 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Work+ 
disability 
benefit 
Work+ 
unemployment 
benefit 
Probability for reference person (a) 0.935 0.048 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Age 0.034 -0.150 -0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.046 0.084 -0.013 0.000 0.005 
Age (quadratic term) 0.002 0.055 0.003 -0.001 0.005 -0.020 -0.050 0.008 0.000 -0.003 
Duration of inactivity (in days) -0.006 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Female 0.028 -0.017 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Non-European non-native -0.018 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 
European non-native -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.008 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Low educational indication 0.012 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
High educational indication -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a) An reference person is defined as: male, 40 years old, inactive for one year until quarter of measurement, native origin and a middle educational indication. 
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4 SIMULATION RESULTS 
4.1 OUTLINE OF THE METHOD USED 
By using the multinomial logit models (and for some less important transitions 
the sample means from the IPO data), transition probabilities for the various 
groups of individuals (defined by gender, ethnic group and education indicator) 
were computed. For each group the probabilities vary with age. Some of them are 
also depend on duration and on previous unemployment. Then these probabilities 
are used to simulate life courses for a cohort of people. A life course is defined as 
the period that starts with leaving school and ends at the pension age of 65. We 
sometimes also use the phrase ´work life’. In this section we explain the method 
underlying the simulations. 
As a starting point for the life course we take the age of 15. From there on we 
have to determine how many 15-year-olds leave school, how many 16-years-olds 
leave school, etcetera. Furthermore, we have to specify the percentages of 
school-leavers going to work, social assistance, disability benefit or inactivity. 
This information has been distracted from the Dutch 2002 Labour Force Survey. 
This survey provides the information about the school-to-labour market transition 
differentiated by personal characteristics (gender, age, educational attainment and 
ethnic origin) as well as the situation directly after leaving school (work, social 
assistance, disability and inactivity). More details can be found in Appendix 3.  
Given the initial situation of the cohort of people leaving school and its 
composition according to gender, ethnic group and educational indicator, the 
transition probabilities were applied to simulate complete work lives, with 
subsequent periods of work, unemployment, etc. Work lives cover the period 
starting on the age of 15 until 65. The simulations are based on random drawings 
taken from the computed probability distributions. A simulation consists of 
100.000 individual work lives, so that the resulting frequency distribution for the 
number and the duration of employment and unemployment periods becomes 
stable. Time is again made up from quarters. Hence, for each imaginary person 
200 points in time have been computed (50 years and 4 quarters in each year). 
A number of restrictions are incorporated into the simulation model. The first 
restriction applies to unemployment insurance benefits. According to the 
Unemployment Act people qualify for an unemployment insurance benefit only 
after they have had a job prior to the unemployment period. In general people 
have to work for at least 26 of the last 39 weeks to qualify for a short-term 
unemployment benefit of 6 months. When people worked at least 4 of the last 5 
years they qualify for an unemployment benefit with duration between 6 months 
and 5 years depending on their age and the years of working experience. Ignoring 
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these rules in our simulation could imply that a person receives an 
unemployment insurance benefit for much longer than is legally possible. 
Therefore we have constructed a variable that computes at each point in time the 
entitlement of a person to an unemployment insurance benefit given the work life 
of the person until this time. If a person becomes unemployed at that time he 
cannot stay longer in this situation than is possible on the basis of his entitlement. 
If he is still unemployed when reaching the end of the entitlement period, he 
automatically moves to social assistance. A similar approach is taken with 
respect to sickness benefits. People are allowed to stay in a sickness benefit for at 
most two years. If they are then still unfit for work they automatically go to a 
disability benefit. 
A third restriction we make is to exclude certain transitions that occur in our 
(IPO) dataset because of administrative inaccuracies, but that are impossible or 
highly unlikely to occur from a theoretical or practical point of view. The main 
restriction is the exclusion of all transitions to an unemployment insurance 
benefit other than from a situation of work or sickness benefit. Finally, we 
impose the restriction is that all people leave school between 15 and 25 years of 
age. In reality some, although not many, people leave school after the age of 25 
but this is not possible in our simulations. 
We have made several simulations. The baseline simulation is the one based on 
the logit models in which duration dependence and cumulative unemployment 
are included. We have also carried out two other simulations: a) a simulation 
based on logit models with duration dependence but no cumulative 
unemployment, and b) a simulation solely based on IPO sample averages for the 
transition probabilities. The results for a) are very similar to those of the baseline 
simulation and will not be discussed further. Also the results for b) are similar 
but here the differences are sometimes somewhat more pronounced. We will only 
present results for the baseline simulation, but mention the cases where the 
differences with the latter simulation are somewhat bigger. It is important to 
note, though, that the impact of cumulative unemployment as we have modelled 
it is small. Duration dependence is more important, but including it does not alter 
the outcomes fundamentally. The outcomes of the baseline simulation are 
presented in the next section. 
The simulation model can also be used for policy-relevant simulations. The 
following policy-relevant simulations were simulated: 
1. Introduction of a saving variant for unemployment benefits according to 
which people save for part of their own future benefit. 
2. A simulation under the assumption that school leavers enter the labour 
market during a recession period, which is then followed by a period of 
recovery. 
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During the preparation of the reform of the Unemployment Act that is taking 
place, one of the options discussed was the introduction of an individualised 
system according to which people were to save for their own future benefits (or 
for part of it). The idea behind such a system is that it would provide incentives 
for people to stay out of unemployment. 
The second simulation has been carried out in view of the fact that during 
recession periods unemployment tends to increase particularly among young 
people. This gives rise to the fear of a lost generation. With the simulation we 
analyse to what extent a ‘bad’ start in the labour market also affects future job 
chances negatively. 
4.2 OUTCOMES OF THE BASELINE SIMULATION 
4.2.1 GENERAL PATTERNS 
It turns out that almost everyone has a job for at least some time during their life 
course (last column, table 4.1). About 90 percent receives a social benefit at least 
once during their working lives. The types of social benefits used most are early 
retirement (51 percent) and social assistance benefit (46 percent) followed by 
unemployment benefits (36 percent). 
The percentage of people in a job is highest in the group aged between 25 and 35 
years. After the age of 35 this percentage steadily decreases. During the first 
phase of the life course (until the age of 25) 29 percent of all simulated persons 
receive a social benefit at least once. This mainly consists of social assistance 
benefits. During the next phases (25-55) the percentage of people receiving a 
social benefit remains around 30 percent. Only the composition of the use of 
benefit types changes from mainly use of social assistance benefit to more using 
unemployment insurance benefits and disability benefits. During the last phase 
the percentage of people receiving a social benefit sharply increases to 79 
percent. This is mainly caused by early retirement. 
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Table 4.1 Percentage of people with a job or one of the social benefits during different 
stages of life and during the entire life course 
Percentage of people that were 
at least once in the situation 
concerned 
In the age 
of 15-25 
In the age 
of 25-35 
In the age 
of 35-45 
In the age 
of 45-55 
In the age 
of 55-65 
During the 
entire life 
course 
Job 94% 97% 94% 90% 81% 99% 
Social benefit 29% 26% 29% 31% 79% 90% 
Benefits:       
Unemployment benefit 6% 10% 10% 11% 8% 36% 
Combining work and 
unemployment benefit 7% 11% 9% 8% 5% 32% 
Disability benefit 3% 6% 8% 12% 19% 29% 
Social assistance benefit 24% 15% 16% 14% 12% 46% 
Sickness benefit 3% 3% 2% 1% 0.2% 13% 
Early retirement 0% 0% 0% 0% 51% 51% 
Source:  Simulation based on transition probabilities from the income panel 1989-2000 and a cohort 
of school leavers 2002. 
 
4.2.2 CONCENTRATION IN THE USE OF SOCIAL BENEFITS 
As mentioned before around 90 percent of all cohort members received a social 
benefit and around 40 percent received an unemployment benefit for at least 
some time. Although many people receive a social benefit for at least some time 
during their working lives the use of social benefits is not evenly distributed 
among these people. This can be visualised by Lorenz curves. To do so 
individuals are sorted based on the total time during which they receive a social 
benefit. This total time is computed by taking the sum total of all the benefit 
spells during the life course. The Lorenz curve indicates which part of the total 
amount of time in social benefits accounted for by all the cohort members 
together (y) is taken care of by the first x per cent of the (sorted) benefit receivers 
(starting with the non-users).  A perfectly equal distribution is represented by the 
straight line y = x. The ‘flatter’ the line, the more unequal the distribution. 
Figure 4.1 shows the Lorenz curve for the use of social benefits in general. It 
appears that the 10 per cent of the people that use social benefits most during 
their work lives account for 36 percent of the total amount of time spent in social 
benefits by the whole cohort. If we look at the concentration in the use of 
unemployment insurance benefits separately, the result is similar to that of social 
benefits as a whole (figure 4.2). However, the concentration in the use of social 
assistance benefits is higher. The 10 per cent ‘big’ users of this type of benefit 
take care of almost half of the total amount of time spent in social assistance 
benefits by the whole cohort. The use of disability benefits is less concentrated 
than the use of unemployment insurance benefits. Finally, among the various 
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social benefits, early retirement benefits are the type of benefit with the lowest 
concentration among the ones that use it. 
As was mentioned previously we have also made a simulation in which the 
transition probabilities are directly computed from the IPO data, differ according 
to the personal characteristics, but do not depend on duration or previous 
unemployment experience. Although the results of this simulation are in general 
very similar to the results presented here for the baseline simulation, they do 
differ with respect to concentration in the use of benefits. Without duration 
dependence and cumulative unemployment, concentration is lower, the 10 per 
cent ‘biggest’ users of social benefits accounting for 30 per cent of the total 
(compared to 36 per cent in the baseline simulation).  
Figure 4.1 Lorenz curve of the use of social benefits 
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Figure 4.2 Lorenz curves of the use of different social benefits 
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How is the use of social benefits for different groups based on gender, ethnic 
origin and educational indication? The first column of table 4.2 show the number 
of social benefit users within each group (male, female, etc.). It appears that 
differences for gender and ethnic origin are relatively small. Men and non-natives 
tend to make somewhat more use of social benefits than women and native 
people. Educational indication shows more differences. People with higher 
educational education less often received a social benefit. The second column 
shows the amount of concentration within each group. As can be seen the amount 
of concentration is very much the same for all groups (10 percent of the biggest 
users account for about 33 percent of total use). Only the group of non-European 
non-natives shows a lesser degree of concentration (25%). 
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Table 4.2 Concentration in the use of social benefits for different groups 
 % receiving a social benefit at least once during their life course 
Concentration within the group of 
users of social benefits 
  (10% of the users account for ..% of total use of social benefits) 
Total cohort 90% 36% 
Gender   
Male 93% 32% 
Female 87% 35% 
Ethnic origin   
Native 89% 34% 
Non-European non-
native 97% 25% 
European non-native 93% 33% 
Educational 
indication   
Low  94% 32% 
Average 91% 33% 
High  83% 32% 
Source:  Simulation based on transition probabilities from the income panel 1989-2000 and a cohort 
of school leavers 2002. 
 
In table 4.3 the use of social benefits during the life course is shown. Each 
simulated person in our cohort has the same age at each moment during the life 
course. Therefore, each age group in the table represents all 100,000 simulated 
persons. Concentration in the use of social benefits is more or less constant until 
the age of 45. For the last two age groups concentration is lower.  
Table 4.3 Concentration in the use of social benefits over the life course 
Use of social benefits over the 
life course Concentration within the group of users of social benefits 
 (10% of the users account for ..% of total use of social benefits) 
Cohort during age period:  
15-25 years 33% 
25-35 years 31% 
35-45 years 31% 
45-55 years 21% 
55-65 years 20% 
Source:  Simulation based on transition probabilities from the income panel 1989-2000 and a cohort 
of school leavers 2002. 
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What kind of people makes most use of social benefits? Table 4.4 shows the 
characteristics of these people. It does this for all types of benefits taken together, 
but for unemployment, social assistance, disability and early retirement benefits 
separately. The group of people making use of social benefits most is in general 
characterised as mainly female, low educated and relatively often non-native. 
This is very similar to the groups making most use of social assistance benefit 
and (to a lesser degree) disability benefits. Therefore it is likely that this is 
mainly the same group of people. The characteristics of the people claiming often 
unemployment insurance and early retirement benefits are not so different from 
the characteristics of the entire cohort of people.  
Table 4.4 Characteristics of people making most use of social benefits in total and of 
each benefit separately. 
Characteristics of 5 percent of 
users of benefit making most use of 
it 
Male Native Low 
educational 
indication 
Average 
educational 
indication 
Social benefits 20% 49% 70% 28% 
Unemployment benefit 51% 79% 24% 59% 
Social assistance benefit 14% 43% 77% 22% 
Disability benefit 36% 69% 46% 44% 
Early retirement benefit 56% 87% 28% 51% 
Percentage of total cohort 48% 85% 30% 49% 
Source:  Simulation based on transition probabilities from the income panel 1989-2000 and a cohort 
of school leavers 2002. 
 
4.2.3 RISK PROFILE 
Which people are in high risk of becoming dependent on social benefits? One 
way of measuring this is dividing total time in social benefits by total working 
time over the life course. In this way we compute risk profiles for each 
individual. Table 4.5 shows this ratio for several classes of risk profiles. Only 10 
per cent of the cohort members never received a social benefit during their life 
course. For about 60 per cent of the cohort the total time spent in a benefit is 30 
per cent or less than the total time spent in employment. Almost 10 percent spent 
more time receiving a social benefit than working. 
Women, non-natives and people with a low education have the most 
unfavourable risk profiles. This is in line with the previous section, which 
showed that these are the characteristics of people making most use of social 
benefits. 
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Table 4.5 Risk profile of cohort members (total time in social benefits divided by total 
time in employment) 
Risk profile Ratio Percentage of individuals 
Never received social benefit 0% 10% 
More time working than receiving a social 
benefit 1-15% 38% 
 15-30% 21% 
 30-45% 10% 
 45-60% 5% 
 60-100% 6% 
More time receiving a social benefit than 
working >100% 10% 
 Total 100% 
Total cohort 100.000 
Source:  Simulation based on transition probabilities from the income panel 1989-2000 and a cohort of 
school leavers 2002. 
 
4.3 POLICY SIMULATIONS 
4.3.1 INDIVIDUAL SAVING FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
What would it mean if people were to save for their own benefit (or part of their 
benefit)? To that end we assume that for each day a person is in employment he 
saves an amount of money corresponding with 0.035 days claiming 
unemployment insurance benefits. This means that given the patterns found in 
the baseline simulation on average there is roughly enough saving to pay for the 
benefits. However, given the risk profiles treated in the previous section, one 
might expect that some people save not enough to finance (all) their benefits, 
while others will save too much. 
An aspect not incorporated in this risk profile is the chronological order of 
working and receiving a benefit. We just used summations over the life course. 
However as was mentioned earlier according to the Unemployment Act people 
qualify only for an unemployment benefit after some period of work8. Therefore, 
at each point in time we compute the level of savings for each individual. It 
depends both on the total time in employment and the total time in an 
                                                     
8 In general 26 of the last 39 weeks to qualify for an unemployment benefit of 6 months. 
When people worked at least 4 of the last 5 years they qualify for an unemployment benefit 
with duration between 6 months and 5 years depending on age and years of working 
experience. 
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unemployment benefit to date. If a person works he adds to his savings, but if he 
becomes unemployed he uses some or all of the savings for his benefit. One of 
the implications of such a system is that it is possible that during one’s life course 
one does not save enough, while at the same time savings are left unused at the 
end of the life course. We assume that the benefit level per day is fixed and that 
people always use their savings when being unemployed. 
Table 4.6 Saving for unemployment benefit 
 % of cohort Average surplus of savings at 65 
years of age 
Never received an unemployment benefit 53% 99% 
Saved for 1-25 percent of required benefit 14% 57% 
Saved for 25-50 percent of required benefit 13% 45% 
Saved for 50-75 percent of required benefit 6% 44% 
Saved for 75-99 percent of required benefit 3% 42% 
Saved for 100 percent of required benefit 11% 62% 
Total cohort 100% 77% 
Source:  Simulation based on transition probabilities from the income panel 1989-2000 and a cohort of 
school leavers 2002. 
 
Table 4.6 shows how many people never received an unemployment benefit at all 
and how many people saved for what part of the required benefit. About half of 
the cohort never received an unemployment benefit during their life course9. 
Only 10 percent worked long enough to pay for their entire unemployment 
benefit, while 27 percent of our cohort members (more than half of those using 
unemployment insurance at least once) face a substantial shortage of savings. At 
the end of the life cycle however most people have a surplus of savings due to 
the fact that they often work for sometime after receiving an unemployment 
benefit. 
The same patterns apply to specific groups of people differentiated by gender, 
ethnic origin and level of educational (see Appendix 4). Around 10-12 percent of 
each group saves enough to finance all the benefits needed. Around 25 percent 
faces a substantial shortage of saving. Those originating from non-Western 
countries face substantially higher shortage than other groups, while there are 
fewer people with a substantial lack of savings among those with high education. 
                                                     
9  64 percent if we leave out the situation in which a job is combined with an unemployment 
benefit. 
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Our conclusion is that saving for one’s own benefit is not feasible.  One could 
argue that the risk of being short of savings or, once in unemployment, lacking 
the financial means to pay for the benefits, would have an impact on behaviour. 
People might put more effort in to avoid becoming unemployed and, if that 
appears to be impossible, to leave unemployment as soon as possible. However, 
it is very unlikely that the behavioural effects are big enough to create equality 
between savings and use of benefits. One might, of course, consider a system in 
which only part of the benefit is individualized. However, if we assume that in 
such a system unemployed people are at least paid the social minimum, this 
would imply that for many people the difference with the current (completely 
collectively financed) system is not so big. As a result the incentives created by a 
partly individualized system will be small, particularly for those that have to rely 
on low-paid labour. However, this is exactly the latter group for which the 
unemployment problem is really serious and one would like to see an effect. So, 
if we design an individualized system in such a way that it creates strong 
incentives, it is totally unacceptable from a social point of view, but if we adapt it 
to a more socially acceptable form it is not effective anymore for the groups for 
which one would like to create effects in view of their high unemployment.   
4.3.2 DOES A RECESSION HAVE PERSISTENT EFFECTS ON WORK LIVES? 
During recession periods the increase in youth unemployment is usually much 
stronger than the increase in average unemployment. This situation gives rise to a 
fear for a lost generation. The basic reasoning behind this fear is that when young 
people enter the labour market and directly become unemployed for a 
considerable time, their future chances will be affected negatively. In this section 
we attempt to test this hypothesis.  
We assume that there is an economic recession during the first part of the life 
course when people are in the age between 18 to 24 years. At the age of 25 the 
overall unemployment rate the economy is back on its structural level. Then, the 
economy is supposed to boom until the cohort reaches the age of 33, when the 
economy retains its structural level. For the rest of the cohort it then stays on this 
structural level. We use the overall unemployment rate as business cycle 
indicator. Figure 4.3 gives the graphical representation. We used the following 
values for the unemployment rate for the different phases of the business cycle: 
8% representing a recession period, 5% representing the structural level of the 
economy and 1.8% representing a booming economy).  
In order to simulate the effects of the business cycle we have to make a 
connection between this cycle and the transition probabilities. To that end we 
have also estimated logit models in which the overall unemployment rate was 
added as an indicator of the business cycle. From these models we determined 
the impact of the business cycle on the transition probabilities. Then we used 
these effects to adjust the transition probabilities from the baseline simulation. 
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Appendix 5 contains more details about the transition probabilities at different 
unemployment rates. 
Figure 4.3 Business cycle in the simulation 
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In figures 4.4a-4.4g the outcomes of the simulation with the effects of the 
business cycle are compared with the outcomes of the initial simulation. Between 
15 to 25 years of age the average use of social benefits is, as expected, higher 
than that in the baseline simulation due to the business cycle (see figure 4.4a until 
4.4e). But in the next years, from 25 until 35 years of age, the time in a social 
benefit is already less than in the baseline simulation. It turns out that after the 
age of 35, when the unemployment rate returns to its average level, the effects of 
the booming period sustain. Average working time remains higher in the 
simulation including the business cycle and average time in social benefits 
remains lower. The only deviation from this pattern is the age group ‘45-55’ 
where we see a higher use of unemployment benefits in the business cycle 
simulation compared to the initial simulation. This is due to the fact that in the 
business cycle simulation people create more entitlement to this type of benefit 
as more time is spent in employment10.  
                                                     
10 In both simulations about the same number of people between 45 and 55 years of age 
received an unemployment benefit. This means that in the simulation with the business cycle 
effect people on average receive this type of benefits for a longer time. 
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Figure 4.4a Average use of unemployment benefits with and without the business 
cycle (in quarters) 
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Initial simulation variant with business cycle effects
 
Figure 4.4b Average use of social assistance benefits with and without the business 
cycle (in quarters) 
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Less satisfactory features of this simulation are that even before the age of 25 the 
employment share in the business cycle simulation is higher and the share of 
inactivity without income is lower than in the baseline simulation (see figures 
4.4f and 4.4g). This might lead to a too optimistic picture for the work life over 
25. However, this does not alter the result that a ´bad´ start in the labour market 
owing to a recession period seems to have only a temporary effect when the 
recession is followed by a recovery period.   
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A limitation of our method of simulation is that we use a cohort of people that 
have the same age at all times and therefore experience the same business cycle 
at the same time. In reality the labour force consists of people of different ages 
who all face different transition probabilities in times of high or low 
unemployment. This could lead for example to a crowding-out of young people 
in the labour market in times of high unemployment. Unemployment among 
youngsters then could be higher than it is in our simulations. However, we still 
think that our simulation indicates that it is not likely that a bad start in the labour 
market lead to a permanent higher risk of unemployment. 
Figure 4.4c Average use of disability benefits with and without the business cycle (in 
quarters) 
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Figure 4.4d Average use of early retirement benefits with and without the business 
cycle (in quarters) 
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Figure 4.4e Average use of the total of social benefits with and without the business 
cycle (in quarters) 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
15-25 25-35 35-45 45-55 55-65
age
av
er
ag
e
Initial simulation variant with business cycle effects
 
Figure 4.4f Average working time with and without the business cycle (in quarters) 
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Figure 4.4g Average time without work or social benefit with and without the 
business cycle (in quarters) 
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5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This report used patterns in work, use of benefits and inactivity without (a 
personal) income as could be observed from the Dutch IPO panel for the period 
1989-2000 to simulate life courses for a large cohort of individuals. The 
simulations are carried out on the basis of transition probabilities that have been 
derived from the panel data. They depend on the personal characteristics of an 
individual. The following characteristics are available: age, gender, ethnic origin 
and level of education (the latter estimated from the income data in the panel). 
For the baseline simulation the transition probabilities were based on the 
multinomial logit models that have been estimated for several situations. In these 
models we also took account of duration dependence and (only in the model for 
the transitions from employment) of cumulating unemployment. By the latter we 
mean that current unemployment causes future unemployment. Duration 
dependence means that the transition probabilities from a certain situation depend 
on the time the person has already stayed in this situation. Both effects appeared 
to be significant. However, the cumulating unemployment effect appears to be 
relatively weak in the simulations. The simulation with only duration dependence 
shows only slight difference with the one with both effects.  Both simulations do 
show differences with a simulation based on sample means of the transition 
probabilities for detailed groups. However, the differences are not that big. 
Therefore, the significance of duration dependence and particularly cumulating 
unemployment is less than one might have expected a priori. 
An important outcome of the analysis is that the use of social benefits is fairly 
concentrated. If we determine the total use of benefits during the work life for 
each individual that has used benefits at least once and rank them from the 
smallest user to the highest user, then the 10 per cent highest users make up for 
36 per cent of the total use of all the users taken together. Of a cohort that is 
monitored throughout its work life, 90 per cent has a benefit at least once. If we 
include the non-users than the 10 per cent highest users take care of 
approximately 40 per cent. 
We find this concentration among all social groups. It varies with age and it is 
somewhat lower at older age, partly because most people enter pre-pension or 
early retirement schemes before the age of 65. The concentration increases with 
the level of education. This is also true if we exclude the non-users. However, 
including the non-users gives a larger difference in concentration between the 
various educational levels as higher educated people have a higher chance of 
staying non-users during their whole work life. 
The concentration in the use of social benefits implies that the idea of an 
individualised benefit system where people save for their own benefits is not 
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feasible. Such a system would imply that many would save not enough to finance 
their benefits from the savings. It has been proposed in order to stimulate people 
to avoid the use of benefits and, if they still become dependent of a benefit, to get 
out of this situation as soon as possible. However, for a considerable proportion 
of the benefit users the total time as a benefit claimant during their work life is 
relatively long compared to the total time in employment. The difference is of 
such size, that it is not realistic to assume that behavioural changes (which are 
not taken into account in the simulations) could lead to a balance between 
savings for benefits and spending on benefits. 
We also tried to simulate what happens if people enter the labour market in a 
recession period, which is then followed by a period of economic recovery. 
Although this simulation is not satisfactory in all respects, it indicates that the 
effects of a ´bad´ start in the labour market are only temporary. This would mean 
that there is no ground for the fear for a lost generation in recession periods. 
However, this conclusion is conditional on the assumption that the recession 
period is temporary and is followed by a period of strong recovery. 
The simulation model could be extended and improved in several ways. The 
underlying data do not provide many options to introduce behavioural elements 
into the model, but one could use the results from other research to incorporate 
such elements. One could think, among other things, on making the transition 
probabilities dependent on replacement rates and participation in inactive labour 
market policy. Furthermore, one could think of extending the model to different 
generations so that it could represent total labour supply, making it possible to 
make a link to the demand side of the labour market. 
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APPENDIX 1  ESTIMATING THE LEVEL OF EDUCATION  
Educational attainment is not available from the data. Therefore we have 
estimated it using the income data in the panel after correction for the influence 
of age and gender. We have computed daily wages by dividing the wage income 
earned during an employment period by the number of days in this period. This 
daily wage is then used as the dependent variable in a linear regression with 
independent variables age and gender (see table A1.1). Both gender and age 
highly influence daily wage. This justifies our decision to correct daily wage for 
these two variables. The residuals of the regression that are ‘cleaned’ from 
gender and age aspects are used as an indication for educational attainment. 
Table A1.1 Linear regression output with dependent variable ‘daily wage’ 
 Beta t-value 
Constant -62.24 -39.03 
Gender 26.60 64.48 
Age (average over total period)  4.57 49.32 
Age (quadratic term) -0.05 -37.00 
   
 
 
N = 59.875 
R2 = 0.168 
We divided the residuals into three equally distributed groups. The group with 
lowest residuals is considered to be the group with low educational attainment, 
the group with the average values as the group with average educational 
attainment and the group with the highest residuals as the group with high 
educational attainment. 
Of course this is a rough estimator. An important limitation of this estimator is 
that we were unable to correct for differences in weekly working hours. Partly 
this effect is covered by the gender variable since women more often work part-
time than men. However, also some of the men work part-time and some of the 
of women work full-time. Especially for people that work part-time there will be 
an underestimation of educational attainment since they receive a lower income 
than people that work full-time. 
We believe however that the proxy is a reasonable estimator for educational 
attainment. This is confirmed by the patterns we observe for the different groups. 
People for whom the estimated level of education is low are, for example, on 
average older and more often unemployed than people for whom the estimates 
indicate a higher education, which is exactly what we observe in reality. 
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APPENDIX 2 ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE 
 MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODELS 
Patterns of work and use of benefits over the life course 
2 
MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION OUTPUT: STARTING SITUATION JOB 
Variable Inactivity Job Retirement 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Work+ 
disability 
benefit 
Work+ 
unemployment 
benefit 
Intercept -4.419*** 0.000 -0.275 -7.508*** -8.441*** -5.408*** -5.459*** -3.969*** -7.788*** -5.166*** 
Age -0.014 0.000 -.532***  .098*** 0.009 -0.003 0.033 -.217*** -0.023 -0.001 
Age (quadratic term) 0.000 0.000  .008*** -.001*** 0.000 0.000 -.001***  .003***  .001*** 0.000 
Duration of working (in days) -.126*** 0.000  .068*** -.102*** 0.003 -.021** -.178*** -.083***  .04** -.027*** 
Duration of working (in days, 
quadratic term)  .002*** 0.000 -.001*** 0.001 0.000 -.001***  .002***  .002*** -.001**  0** 
Female  1.016*** 0.000 -.2***  .655***  .555*** -.145***  .428***  .356***  .287***  .253*** 
Non-European non-native 0.075 0.000 0.192  .872***  .458***  .411***  1.239*** 0.184  .376***  .57*** 
European non-native  .122** 0.000 0.051 0.045 0.049 0.057  .433*** 0.044 0.129  .142** 
Low educational indication  .641*** 0.000 -0.097 0.142  .554*** -0.077  .792***  .476***  .738***  .096** 
High educational indication -.354*** 0.000 -.251*** -.338*** -.35*** -.278*** -.653*** 0.050 -.479*** -.384*** 
Dummy with value 1 for person 
working less than two years 
until quarter of measurement 
and received an unemployment 
or social assistance benefit 
before that. -.623*** 0.000 0.216  1.092***  1.099***  1.602***  1.155*** 0.087 0.131  1.592*** 
Dummy with value 1 for person 
working less than two years 
until quarter of measurement 0.091 0.000  .404** -.682*** -.628** -.174* -.8*** 0.221 -0.045 -.482*** 
* significant on 90%-level 
** significant on 95%-level 
*** significant on 99%-level 
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Model Fitting Information 
 
 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 184170,632    
Final 166744,537 17426,095 99 ,000
 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
 
 
Cox and Snell ,022 
Nagelkerke ,099 
McFadden ,089 
 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
 
Effect 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 166744,537(a) ,000 0 .
LFT_KW 167565,398 820,861 9 ,000
LFT_KW2 168072,725 1328,187 9 ,000
DUUR_HI2 167185,342 440,804 9 ,000
DUUR_HIK 167132,730 388,192 9 ,000
GESL 167889,685 1145,147 9 ,000
ETN_NWA 167160,240 415,703 9 ,000
ETN_WA 166769,653 25,115 9 ,003
OPL_LG 167239,761 495,223 9 ,000
OPL_HG 167012,339 267,802 9 ,000
HXDUM 168627,518 1882,981 9 ,000
DUM 166819,302 74,765 9 ,000
 
 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final 
model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect 
from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 
0. 
(a) This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION OUTPUT: STARTING SITUATION UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT 
Variable Inactivity Job Retirement 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Work+ 
disability 
benefit 
Work+ 
unemployment 
benefit 
Intercept -3.662*** -.609*** -7.798*** -4.543*** -6.542*** 0.000  1.705*** -2.877*** -33.702*** -1.835*** 
Age -0.029  .062*** -0.027  .071** 0.011 0.000 -.203*** -0.067  1.4**  .078*** 
Age (quadratic 
term) -0.0005 -.002*** 0.001 -.001*** -0.0005 0.000  .001*** 0.000003 -.018*** -.002*** 
Duration of 
unemployment 
benefit (in days)  .101*** -.131***  .05*** 0.003  .104*** 0.000  .077*** 0.029 0.035 -.06*** 
Female  1.36*** -.882*** -0.011  .607*** 0.118 0.000 -.659*** -1.005*** -1.125* -.336*** 
Non-European 
non-native -.397** -.51*** -15.945  .338***  .719** 0.000  .433*** -0.729 -0.911 -.222*** 
European non-
native -0.031 -.182*** -0.031 -0.018 0.120 0.000 0.103 -0.332 -16.504 -.11* 
Low educational 
indication  .545*** -.305*** -0.231 0.092  .887*** 0.000  .624*** -0.194 0.884 0.052 
High educational 
indication -.358**  .284*** 0.238 -.239** -0.688 0.000 -0.029 -0.155 0.858 -0.068 
 
* significant on 90%-level 
** significant on 95%-level 
*** significant on 99%-level 
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Model Fitting Information 
 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 69999,586    
Final 62035,814 7963,772 72 ,000
 
 
Pseudo R-Square 
 
Cox and Snell ,196 
Nagelkerke ,229 
McFadden ,112 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 62035,814(a) ,000 0 .
LFT_KW 62241,258 205,444 9 ,000
LFT_KW2 62335,261 299,447 9 ,000
DUUR_HI2 62766,461 730,648 9 ,000
GESL 62955,683 919,869 9 ,000
ETN_NWA 62193,084 157,271 9 ,000
ETN_WA 62053,654 17,841 9 ,037
OPL_LG 62207,369 171,555 9 ,000
OPL_HG 62101,317 65,503 9 ,000
 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final 
model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect 
from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 
0. 
(a) This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION OUTPUT: STARTING SITUATION SOCIAL ASSISTANCE BENEFIT 
Variable Inactivity Job Retirement 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Work+ 
disability 
benefit 
Work+ 
unemployment 
benefit 
Intercept -4.269*** -1.444*** -9.041*** -8.747*** -2.993** -7.218*** 0.000 -8.911*** -5.954 -6.369*** 
Age -0.017  .02* -0.039 0.156 -.204*** 0.072 0.000 0.131 -0.088 -0.020 
Age (quadratic 
term) 0.00002 -.001*** 0.002 -0.002  .003*** -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.0003 0.0001 
Duration of 
unemployment 
benefit (in days) -.039*** -.032*** -.039** -.057*** -.029** -.077*** 0.000 -0.014 0.031 0.002 
Female  .761*** -.913***  .835** -0.450 -.375* -0.288 0.000 -.72*** -1.018* -.678* 
Non-European 
non-native -.278*** -.417*** 0.137 0.026 -.486* -0.197 0.000 -0.183 -0.667 -0.613 
European non-
native -.236** -.238*** 0.380 -0.302 -0.058 -0.007 0.000 -0.443 -0.180 -0.792 
Low educational 
indication  .164* -.81*** 0.164 -0.253 0.492 -.484* 0.000 -0.059 0.017 -0.174 
High educational 
indication -0.104  .73*** 0.090 -0.293 -0.165 -0.298 0.000  1.271***  1.348* -0.176 
 
* significant on 90%-level 
** significant on 95%-level 
*** significant on 99%-level 
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A2.7
Model Fitting Information 
 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 52055,293    
Final 48319,625 3735,668 72 ,000
 
Pseudo R-Square 
 
Cox and Snell ,044 
Nagelkerke ,092 
McFadden ,070 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 48319,625(a) ,000 0 .
LFT_KW 48340,407 20,782 9 ,014
LFT_KW2 48360,582 40,957 9 ,000
DUUR_HI2 48691,016 371,390 9 ,000
GESL 49272,471 952,846 9 ,000
ETN_NWA 48480,242 160,617 9 ,000
ETN_WA 48355,479 35,854 9 ,000
OPL_LG 48805,456 485,831 9 ,000
OPL_HG 48642,557 322,931 9 ,000
 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final 
model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect 
from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 
0. 
(a)  This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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MULTINOMIAL REGRESSION OUTPUT: STARTING SITUATION INACTIVITY 
Variable Inactivity Job Retirement 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployment 
benefit 
Social 
assistance 
benefit 
Unknown 
situation 
Work+ 
disability 
benefit 
Work+ 
unemployment 
benefit 
Intercept 0.000 -1.086*** -4.458*** 
-
11.084*** -6.931*** -11.52*** -9.13*** -2.949*** -11.134*** -15.857*** 
Age 0.000 -.079*** -.216***  .158** -0.032  .273***  .266*** -.236*** 0.017  .445*** 
Age (quadratic 
term) 0.000  .001***  .003*** -.002*  .001*** -.003*** -.004***  .004*** 0.001 -.006** 
Duration of 
inactivity (in 
days) 0.000  .034***  .031*** -0.002 -.03*** -0.011  .021*** -.038*** 0.008 -0.033 
Female 0.000 -.462*** -.505*** -.713** -2.341*** -2.101*** -.747*** -.881*** -2.274*** -1.144** 
Non-European 
non-native 0.000 -.094*** 0.146  .946** -0.109 -0.006  1.399*** -0.284  1.286** 0.404 
European non-
native 0.000 0.002  .451** 0.508 -.88**  .732***  .693*** -.523** -0.544 -0.619 
Low educational 
indication 0.000 -.201*** -.321* 0.315 0.343 -.835*** -.24*** -.332** 0.686 -0.024 
High educational 
indication 0.000  .052** 0.181 0.504 -0.103 -0.451  .158** 0.027 0.965 0.843 
* significant on 90%-level 
** significant on 95%-level 
*** significant on 99%-level 
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A2.9
Model Fitting Information 
 
Model 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 124822,230    
Final 118657,161 6165,069 72 ,000
 
Pseudo R-Square 
 
Cox and Snell ,021 
Nagelkerke ,049 
McFadden ,038 
 
Likelihood Ratio Tests 
 
Effect 
-2 Log 
Likelihood of 
Reduced 
Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 118657,161(a
) ,000 0 .
LFT_KW 119562,588 905,428 9 ,000
LFT_KW2 119411,717 754,556 9 ,000
DUUR_HI2 119829,944 1172,783 9 ,000
GESL 119712,409 1055,248 9 ,000
ETN_NWA 119085,656 428,496 9 ,000
ETN_WA 118743,520 86,359 9 ,000
OPL_LG 118794,715 137,554 9 ,000
OPL_HG 118675,469 18,308 9 ,032
 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final 
model and a reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect 
from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 
0. 
(a) This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the 
effect does not increase the degrees of freedom. 
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APPENDIX 3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOL-LEAVERS IN 
2002 
The following table is based on the Labour Force Survey 2002 of Statistics 
Netherlands and contains the inflow of school-leavers on the labour market. This 
table was used as a starting point of the simulations. Based on this table we 
determined at what age people leave school and with what situation they start 
after leaving school. 
Table A3.1 Transition from school to the labour market in 2002 
Age 
Educational 
level Gender Ethnic origin Job Unemployed Other Disabled Total Number 
15 Low Male native 0% 0% 32% 0% 32% 438 
  Female native 32% 11% 10% 0% 54% 740 
   Non-European 
non-native 15% 0% 0% 0% 15% 201 
   Total 46% 11% 42% 0% 100% 1.379 
          
16 Low Male native 18% 6% 17% 0% 41% 4.765 
   Non-European 
non-native 2% 0% 1% 0% 2% 280 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 3% 0% 4% 461 
  Female native 18% 5% 10% 0% 33% 3.853 
   Non-European 
non-native 10% 6% 0% 0% 16% 1.878 
   European non-
native 0% 3% 1% 0% 4% 522 
   Total 47% 21% 32% 0% 100% 11.759 
          
17 Low Male native 30% 7% 4% 0% 42% 7.678 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 197 
   European non-
native 0% 0% 2% 0% 2% 344 
  Female native 21% 3% 6% 0% 30% 5.455 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 176 
   European non-
native 3% 0% 1% 0% 4% 741 
 Secondary Male native 8% 1% 2% 0% 11% 1.947 
  Female native 6% 1% 3% 0% 10% 1.789 
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Age 
Educational 
level Gender Ethnic origin Job Unemployed Other Disabled Total Number 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 106 
   Total 70% 12% 18% 0% 100% 18.433 
          
18 Low Male Native 9% 3% 3% 0% 14% 2.921 
   Non-European 
non-native 2% 1% 1% 0% 4% 865 
   European non-
native 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 593 
  Female Native 13% 2% 1% 0% 16% 3.280 
   Non-European 
non-native 0% 1% 0% 1% 2% 447 
   European non-
native 1% 1% 1% 0% 3% 664 
 Secondary Male Native 12% 3% 6% 0% 21% 4.197 
   Non-European 
non-native 3% 0% 1% 0% 4% 745 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 1% 0% 2% 350 
  Female Native 15% 3% 8% 0% 26% 5.206 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 144 
   European non-
native 1% 1% 2% 0% 5% 927 
   Total 60% 15% 24% 1% 100% 20.339 
          
19 Low Male Native 9% 2% 2% 1% 13% 2.246 
   Non-European 
non-native 0% 4% 0% 0% 4% 632 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 230 
  Female Native 10% 1% 2% 0% 13% 2.222 
   Non-European 
non-native 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 426 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 150 
 Secondary Male Native 15% 3% 4% 0% 21% 3.726 
   European non-
native 2% 0% 1% 0% 3% 543 
  Female Native 31% 4% 3% 0% 38% 6.589 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 1% 1% 0% 3% 540 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 155 
   Total 73% 14% 12% 1% 100% 17.459 
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 A3.3
Age 
Educational 
level Gender Ethnic origin Job Unemployed Other Disabled Total Number 
20 Low Male Native 5% 1% 1% 0% 7% 1.649 
  Female Native 3% 0% 1% 0% 4% 889 
   Non-European 
non-native 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 155 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 191 
 Secondary Male Native 25% 2% 3% 0% 29% 6.575 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 1% 3% 0% 4% 903 
   European non-
native 2% 0% 2% 0% 4% 812 
  Female Native 28% 8% 3% 0% 39% 8.671 
   Non-European 
non-native 2% 1% 0% 0% 4% 937 
   European non-
native 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 570 
 High Male Native 0% 1% 0% 0% 1% 128 
  Female Native 2% 0% 1% 0% 3% 676 
   Non-European 
non-native 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 266 
   Total 72% 14% 14% 0% 100% 22.422 
          
21 Low Male Native 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 260 
  Female Native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 109 
 Secondary Male Native 20% 15% 2% 0% 36% 6.048 
   Non-European 
non-native 4% 0% 0% 0% 4% 694 
  Female Native 25% 4% 2% 0% 31% 5.262 
   Non-European 
non-native 3% 0% 0% 1% 4% 702 
   European non-
native 2% 0% 1% 0% 3% 477 
 High Male Native 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 471 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 245 
  Female Native 14% 0% 0% 0% 14% 2.331 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 179 
   Total 75% 19% 5% 1% 100% 16.778 
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Age 
Educational 
level Gender Ethnic origin Job Unemployed Other Disabled Total Number 
22 Low Male European non-
native 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 193 
  Female Native 0% 2% 0% 0% 2% 276 
 Secondary Male Native 18% 4% 1% 0% 23% 3.746 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 2% 0% 3% 480 
  Female Native 21% 2% 0% 0% 23% 3.674 
   Non-European 
non-native 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 444 
   European non-
native 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 354 
 High Male Native 17% 3% 0% 0% 21% 3.362 
  Female Native 19% 2% 2% 0% 22% 3.568 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 83 
   Total 82% 12% 6% 0% 100% 16.180 
          
23 Low Male Native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 193 
 Secondary Male Native 11% 1% 0% 0% 12% 1.659 
   European non-
native 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 140 
  Female Native 9% 3% 1% 0% 12% 1.777 
 High Male Native 16% 9% 1% 0% 26% 3.709 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 129 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 196 
  Female Native 36% 3% 1% 0% 40% 5.746 
   Non-European 
non-native 0% 0% 2% 0% 2% 291 
   European non-
native 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 415 
   Total 78% 16% 6% 0% 100% 14.255 
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Age 
Educational 
level Gender Ethnic origin Job Unemployed Other Disabled Total Number 
24 Low Male European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 210 
  Female European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 200 
 Secondary Male Native 4% 3% 0% 0% 6% 946 
   Non-European 
non-native 4% 3% 0% 0% 7% 974 
   European non-
native 3% 0% 0% 0% 3% 438 
  Female Native 5% 2% 0% 0% 7% 1.009 
 High Male Native 26% 12% 3% 0% 41% 6.033 
   European non-
native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 186 
  Female Native 28% 2% 1% 0% 31% 4.541 
   Non-European 
non-native 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 103 
   Total 74% 21% 4% 0% 100% 14.640 
Source: Labour Force Survey 2002, Statistics Netherlands. 
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A4.1
APPENDIX 4 DETAILED RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION OF AN 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ARRANGEMENT ON THE 
BASIS OF INDIVIDUAL SAVING 
Table A4.1 Degree to which savings for unemployment benefits are sufficient and 
surplus at the age of 65: gender 
 Men  Women  
 
% of cohort 
Average 
surplus at 
65 % of cohort  
Average 
surplus at 
65 
Never received an unemployment benefit 52% 100% 54% 98% 
Saved for 1-25 percent of required benefit 12% 62% 16% 54% 
Saved for 25-50 percent of required benefit 13% 46% 12% 44% 
Saved for 50-75 percent of required benefit 7% 45% 6% 42% 
Saved for 75-99 percent of required benefit 4% 44% 3% 39% 
Saved for 100 percent of required benefit 13% 65% 10% 59% 
Total cohort 100% 78% 100% 76% 
 
Table A4.2 Degree to which savings for unemployment benefits are sufficient and 
surplus at the age of 65: ethnic origin 
 
Native 
 Non-
European 
non-
native 
 
European 
non-
native 
 
 
% of 
cohort 
Average 
surplus at 
65 
% of 
cohort 
Average 
surplus at 
65 
% of 
cohort  
Average 
surplus at 
65 
Never received an 
unemployment benefit 55% 99% 40% 93% 51% 98% 
Saved for 1-25 percent of 
required benefit 13% 60% 26% 45% 15% 52% 
Saved for 25-50 percent of 
required benefit 12% 46% 16% 37% 14% 42% 
Saved for 50-75 percent of 
required benefit 6% 45% 6% 36% 6% 40% 
Saved for 75-99 percent of 
required benefit 3% 42% 3% 35% 3% 43% 
Saved for 100 percent of 
required benefit 11% 63% 9% 56% 11% 60% 
Total cohort 100% 79% 100% 63% 100% 74% 
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Table A4.3 Degree to which savings for unemployment benefits are sufficient and 
surplus at the age of 65: education 
Educational indication Low  Secondary  High  
 
% of 
cohort  
Average 
surplus at 
65 
% of 
cohort 
Average 
surplus at 
65 
% of 
cohort  
Average 
surplus at 
65 
Never received an 
unemployment benefit 51% 97% 50% 99% 63% 100% 
Saved for 1-25 percent of 
required benefit 15% 54% 15% 57% 10% 64% 
Saved for 25-50 percent 
of required benefit 14% 42% 13% 45% 9% 51% 
Saved for 50-75 percent 
of required benefit 7% 42% 6% 44% 4% 47% 
Saved for 75-99 percent 
of required benefit 3% 40% 3% 41% 3% 45% 
Saved for 100 percent of 
required benefit 11% 59% 11% 63% 11% 65% 
Total cohort 100% 74% 100% 76% 100% 84% 
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A5.1
APPENDIX 5 ESTIMATING THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
BUSINESS CYCLE ON THE TRANSITION 
PROBABILITIES 
In order to simulate the effects of the business cycle we had to make a connection 
between this cycle and the transition probabilities. To that end we have also 
estimated logit models in which the overall unemployment rate was added as an 
indicator of the business cycle.  
From these models we then calculated the transition probabilities from jobs, 
unemployment benefits and social assistance benefits at high, average and low 
unemployment rates (1.8, 5.0 and 8.0 percent). To use the resulting probabilities 
in our baseline simulation the sum of these probabilities should equal zero. 
Therefore we used the probabilities at high and low rates minus the probabilities 
at average unemployment rate (5 percent). 
In table b5.1, b5.2 and b5.3 the transition probabilities at low, average and high 
unemployment rates are shown.  
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Table B5.1 Probabilities from unemployment benefits at low, average and high unemployment rates 
 WW          
           
Unemployment 
rate Inactivity Job Pension 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployme
nt benefit 
Social assistance 
benefit Unknown 
Job + disability 
benefit 
Job + 
unemployment 
benefit 
1.8 0.32% 27.10% 0.09% 1.78% 0.12% 57.84% 1.15% 0.38% 0.45% 10.77% 
5.0 0.36% 19.65% 0.08% 1.37% 0.11% 65.16% 1.27% 0.31% 0.14% 11.54% 
8.0 0.39% 14.10% 0.08% 1.03% 0.10% 70.69% 1.36% 0.24% 0.04% 11.95% 
           
Difference 
probability at 
low and 
average rates -0.04% 7.45% 0.00% 0.42% 0.01% -7.32% -0.13% 0.07% 0.32% -0.77% 
Difference 
probability at 
high and 
average rates 0.03% -5.55% 0.00% -0.33% -0.01% 5.52% 0.09% -0.06% -0.09% 0.41% 
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A5.3 
Table B5.2 Probabilities from social assistance benefits at low, average and high unemployment rates 
 
Social 
assistance 
benefit          
           
Unemployment 
rate Inactivity Job Pension 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployme
nt benefit 
Social assistance 
benefit Unknown 
Job + disability 
benefit 
Job + 
unemployment 
benefit 
1.8 0.45% 19.36% 0.02% 0.15% 0.12% 0.14% 79.58% 0.04% 0.02% 0.12% 
5.0 0.51% 15.10% 0.02% 0.12% 0.08% 0.20% 83.76% 0.11% 0.01% 0.09% 
8.0 0.57% 11.82% 0.03% 0.09% 0.06% 0.28% 86.83% 0.25% 0.01% 0.06% 
           
Difference 
probability at 
low and 
average rates -0.06% 4.26% 0.00% 0.03% 0.04% -0.06% -4.18% -0.06% 0.00% 0.03% 
Difference 
probability at 
high and 
average rates 0.06% -3.28% 0.01% -0.03% -0.03% 0.08% 3.08% 0.14% 0.00% -0.02% 
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Table B5.3 Probabilities from a job at low, average and high unemployment rates 
 Job          
           
Unemployment 
rate Inactivity Job Pension 
Sickness 
benefit 
Disability 
benefit 
Unemployme
nt benefit 
Social assistance 
benefit Unknown 
Job + disability 
benefit 
Job + 
unemployment 
benefit 
1.8 0.13% 99.29% 0.04% 0.07% 0.08% 0.12% 0.02% 0.03% 0.12% 0.11% 
5.0 0.12% 99.09% 0.04% 0.07% 0.06% 0.25% 0.03% 0.03% 0.08% 0.23% 
8.0 0.12% 98.66% 0.04% 0.06% 0.04% 0.49% 0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.46% 
           
Difference 
probability at 
low and 
average rates 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% -0.13% -0.01% 0.00% 0.04% -0.12% 
Difference 
probability at 
high and 
average rates 0.00% -0.44% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% 0.23% 0.01% 0.00% -0.03% 0.22% 
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